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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Across the United States, many resettled Iraqi refugees are wondering how, after fleeing
persecution at home to seek refuge in a country that barely tolerated them, they have
found themselves in “the land of opportunity” with little hope of achieving a secure and
decent life. From Washington, D.C. to Detroit1 to San Diego, recently resettled Iraqi
refugees face odds so heavily stacked against them that most end up jobless, some even
homeless.
One Iraqi widow in D.C. lives with her three young children in a shelter. “I left Iraq to find
security,” she says. “But what kind of security is it to live in a homeless shelter?”2
This report seeks to shed light on the oft-forgotten domestic side of the refugee equation,
focusing on Iraqis recently resettled in the United States. Though many advocates worked
tirelessly to encourage the U.S. government to accept Iraqis who were forced to flee a war
initiated by the United States, few have studied what happens to those refugees after they
arrive here. Indeed, while the international community identifies resettlement as one of
three “durable solutions” for refugees, there has been scarce focus on just how durable the
U.S. resettlement system actually is.
The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) is unique in giving new life and
opportunity to millions of refugees, accepting many times more than the rest of the world
combined. But this report finds that the United States is opening its gates to refugees and
simply forgetting about them after they have arrived. In the process, the United States is in
danger of failing to meet its legal obligations to extend protection to the most vulnerable
refugees, promote their long-term self-sufficiency, and support their integration.3 As these
new refugees from Iraq arrive in ever-greater numbers,4 and as the U.S. economy
continues to offer little prospect for those seeking work, there is an urgent need to diagnose
the ills of refugee resettlement before they become incurable.
This report is the culmination of months of research by a team of students at Georgetown
University Law Center in Washington, D.C. The topic was proposed and designed by
members of the student group Georgetown Human Rights Action in partnership with the
Law Center’s Human Rights Institute. The project sought to determine the extent to which
Iraqi refugees have been afforded protection and a durable solution through the USRAP.5
To this end, researchers conducted extensive fact-finding, including interviews in the
1
For the sake of clarity and for the confidentiality of our refugee interviewees, this report will refer to the
Washington, D.C. metro area and the Detroit metro area as “D.C.” and “Detroit,” respectively.
2
Interview with DHTO 1, in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 11, 2009).
3
This project sought to determine the extent to which Iraqi refugees have been afforded protection and a durable
solution through the USRAP. Throughout the report, the broad terms long-term self-sufficiency and long-term
integration is used to describe both the goal of the USRAP and the standard against which it is measured. The
term is intended to carry a particular legal connotation as a reference to refugee law as well as a group of
international human rights norms, both of which are echoed in the USRAP legal framework. If the United States is
to meet its own aims and serve as a guarantor of security for those it welcomes to its shores, it is imperative that
U.S. policies be based on respect for these legal norms.
4
DEP’T. OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS REPORT AS OF AUGUST 31, 2009
[hereinafter August 2009 Admissions Report], available at
http://wrapsnet.org/Reports/AdmissionsArrivals/tabid/211/language/en-US/Default.aspx.
5
We are aware that “USRAP” technically refers to the program administered by the Department of State’s Bureau
of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) that coordinates the admission of refugees into the United States. We
are also aware that the services provided by the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee
Resettlement (ORR) are often not considered part of the USRAP. In this report, however, we will use the term
USRAP to refer to the entire process and program: from the identification of refugees to their arrival in the United
States, and from their initial placement to their longer-term integration. We do so both to simplify terminology and
to reinforce our belief that the USRAP should function as a single program.
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Washington, D.C.; Detroit, Michigan; San Diego, California; and Amman, Jordan. In order
to evaluate the USRAP, researchers used U.S. obligations to refugees under international
and domestic law as a baseline.
The project’s research supports the following findings that are further detailed in the report:
•

Iraqi refugees rarely enjoy legal protection and long-term self-sufficiency in Jordan.
The overwhelming majority of Iraqi refugees interviewed in Jordan could not secure
legal employment in the formal economy. Not all Iraqi refugees are registered with
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which compromises
their ability to gain access to assistance. Moreover, most Iraqi refugees in Jordan do
not have access to adequate legal protections such as residency, work permits, and
police protection, and are discriminated against, extorted, and abused as a result.

•

Resettlement remains an important solution for many Iraqi refugees.
Some
refugees, including particularly vulnerable refugees, are refusing resettlement offers
to the United States because of a perceived lack of post-resettlement services.
However, most Iraqi refugees interviewed for this report desired to be resettled to
the United States.

•

The application of mainstream U.S. anti-poverty programs to refugee assistance
under the USRAP does not promote the long-term self-sufficiency of refugees. It
does not break down barriers to sustainable employment, employment services are
not properly funded, English language training is insufficient, transportation is
inadequate, and professional recertification is not viable. These deficiencies result in
low employment rates for Iraqi refugees. Additionally, cash assistance is insufficient,
both in amount and duration, to allow refugees to support themselves. Finally, the
USRAP makes it difficult for refugees to secure medical care, and treatment options
are insufficient to address the serious mental health issues that affect many Iraqi
refugees.

•

Poor planning and coordination throughout the USRAP amplify the problems that
refugees face. Pre-resettlement processing takes little account of post-resettlement
needs when gathering information about individual refugees. The USRAP does not
base services capacity-setting on current or future refugee flows, leaving programs
improperly funded. Secondary migration is not properly tracked, further preventing
the USRAP from targeting resources to actual needs.

In accordance with
recommendations:

these

findings,

this

report

presents

the

following

general

•

Refugee resettlement should be decoupled from U.S. anti-poverty programs and
tailored to the unique needs and experiences of refugees. Refugee assistance should
be increased from eight to eighteen months, and programs designed to promote the
long-term self-sufficiency and integration of refugees should be better funded. A
stronger emphasis should be placed on the core barriers to self-sufficiency and
integration, including lack of English language skills, lack of transportation, and lack
of opportunities for education and recertification.

•

Funding for employment and social services should be tailored to estimates of
incoming refugee arrivals and secondary migration, as well as the unique needs of
these particular groups. Funding should not be based on the number of past refugee
arrivals.

2

•

All actors within the USRAP must improve planning and information sharing
capabilities. Planning should anticipate and prepare for the unique needs of each
refugee group prior to arrival. In order to tailor services for refugees, actors must
take into account important information on refugees collected in the resettlement
process, such as health status and professional background.

3
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INTRODUCTION
What happens to Iraqi refugees after they have been resettled in the United States? How
effective is the USRAP in helping to ensure long-term self-sufficiency and integration? To
answer these questions, teams of Georgetown Law students conducted extensive interviews
in Detroit, Michigan, and the Washington, D.C. metro-area in March 2009, in Amman,
Jordan in May 2009, and in San Diego, California in August 2009. In the United States,
researchers interviewed Iraqi refugees, voluntary agencies (volags) that resettle refugees,
government and not-for-profit organizations that provide services to refugees, and policy
makers that shape and implement the USRAP. In Amman, researchers interviewed Iraqi
refugees that were in the process of being resettled to the United States and those who
were considering resettlement to the United States. The research team also interviewed
individuals at the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and
international and domestic non-governmental organizations that work with Iraqi refugees.
A full accounting of all individuals and organizations interviewed can be found in Appendix I.
For the safety of participating refugees, all names of refugees in this report appear as
aliases. Similarly, in many cases researchers spoke to individuals who work in various
aspects of refugee resettlement who provided information on condition of anonymity. Such
information is attributed to a generic person with his or her employment title, such as “a
caseworker.”
This report is organized in several Parts. Part II provides an overview of the USRAP and
explains how it works. In this Part, the report discusses the various stakeholders and their
roles and functions within the program are discussed. It also places special emphasis on
how the USRAP operates within the global refugee protection framework, and the
international refugee and human rights law that supports it.
Drawing on the team’s research concerning Iraqi refugees in Jordan, a primary destination
for refugees fleeing Iraq, Part III addresses why resettlement is such an important solution
for the most vulnerable Iraqi refugees. For these refugees, repatriation to Iraq and local
integration in countries of first asylum are not viable options. The research team found that
Iraqis in Jordan are generally unable to become self-sufficient, cannot access basic rights
and protections, and face discrimination and abuse. This makes life in Jordan unsustainable
for most Iraqi refugees and resettlement to third countries, like the United States, an
important protection option.
Part IV explains how resettlement in the United States has left many Iraqi refugees in a
precarious situation. The research team found that the USRAP is not doing enough to
promote the long-term self-sufficiency and integration of Iraqi refugees resettled to Detroit,
San Diego, and D.C. Refugees do not receive enough financial assistance, and services
remain insufficient to prepare refugees for sustainable employment. Meanwhile, the lack of
strategic planning and coordination within the USRAP amplify these problems by failing to
anticipate the needs of refugee populations prior to arrival and failing to direct precious
resources to localities with the highest numbers of arriving refugees.
Part V provides the conclusion, and Part VI proposes recommendations.

5
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II. RESETTLEMENT AND THE USRAP
The USRAP fits into the broader international framework that regulates the legal status of
refugees outlined in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee
Convention) and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Protocol).6 The
Refugee Convention and Protocol are the principal international instruments established for
the protection of refugees and provide the most comprehensive codification of the rights of
refugees worldwide.
These international instruments define the term “refugee” and
establish basic minimum standards for the treatment of refugees.7 One of the most
important underlying principles of the Convention is a state commitment to nonrefoulement.
That is, persons with a well-founded fear of persecution on account of their race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group, cannot be forcibly
returned to their country of origin.8
The UNHCR is mandated with the task of protecting and assisting refugees.9 Under the
Refugee Convention and Protocol, contracting states undertake to cooperate with the
UNHCR in the exercise of its functions.10 While the UNHCR's primary purpose is to
safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees, its ultimate goal is to find durable solutions
that will enable refugees to rebuild their lives in dignity and peace. There are three possible
solutions promoted by the UNHCR: voluntary repatriation to a refugee’s home country; local
integration in the country of first asylum; or resettlement to a third country when it is
impossible for a person return home or remain in the host country.11 Of these three
solutions, resettlement remains the least utilized, with less than one percent of all refugees
worldwide resettled to third countries.12
Despite the low number of refugees who benefit from resettlement, it is an extremely
important protection tool. First, resettlement serves as an instrument for international
responsibility and burden sharing. Today, developing countries serve as countries of first
asylum to the vast majority of refugees, while more developed countries conduct
resettlement programs.13 Second, when used strategically, resettlement is a tool that
governments can use in diplomatic relations to help secure additional benefits for refugees
who will not be resettled. That is, countries like the United States can offer to resettle some

6

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees Jul. 28, 1951 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1951) [hereinafter Refugee
Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force
Oct. 4, 1967.
7
With respect to access to courts, elementary school education, public assistance, and social security, refugees are
afforded rights equivalent to those of the nationals in the country in which they reside. See Refugee Convention,
supra note 6, arts. 22-24. For many other matters, including housing and employment provisions, refugees are
afforded “treatment as favorable as possible and, in any event, not less favorable than that accorded to aliens
generally in the same circumstances.” Id. at arts. 18, 21. Refugees are also afforded basic rights under
international human rights norms, many of which are widely considered to be customary international law. For
example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that every person is afforded “a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
8
See Refugee Convention, supra note 6, art. I(a)(2).
9
See Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. res. 428 (V), annex, 5 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c39e1.html.
10
See Refugee Convention, supra note 6, preamble.
11
“What We Do”, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbf.html.
12
Erika Feller, Assistant High Comm’r – Protection, Statement to the Fifty-eighth Session of the Executive
Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme in Geneva (Oct. 3, 2007), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/admin/ADMIN/4704d4f32.pdf.
13
Global Consultations on International Protection, 2001-2002, Strengthening and Expanding Resettlement Today:
Dilemmas, Challenges and Opportunities, EC/GC/02/7 (Apr. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Strengthening and Expanding
Resettlement Today].
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refugees if the host country agrees to locally integrate or provide work permits for other
refugees.14 Third, refugees gain legal protection through resettlement that they might not
otherwise have, such as legal residency and public assistance.15 Fourth, resettled refugees
bring many assets to their new communities, spur economic growth, and stimulate
transformative cross-cultural experiences.16 Finally, resettled refugees are often able to
provide remittances to friends and family members in countries of origin and first asylum.17
The USRAP
Although refugee resettlement to the United States historically had geo-political overtones,
it has evolved to primarily serve as a vehicle to provide safety and sanctuary for those of
particular humanitarian concern.18 Following the large numbers of refugees that began
arriving in the United States from Southeast Asia in the 1970s, Congress officially
established the USRAP through the Refugee Act of 1980.19 The Refugee Act has two basic
purposes: to provide a uniform procedure for refugee admissions, and to authorize federal
assistance to resettle refugees and promote their self-sufficiency.20 It also recognizes the
role of the federal government in assisting states, private volags, and local communities in
resettling refugees. Thus, the USRAP serves as a true public-private partnership designed
to facilitate the resettlement of refugees.
Three U.S. government agencies are responsible for the central functions of the USRAP:


The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), adjudicates individual refugee admissions cases overseas
through the overseas deployment of its Refugee Corps.



The Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) sets
refugee admissions policy and provides refugee assistance both overseas and in the
initial resettlement period.



The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), within the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), administers comprehensive resettlement services including
employment training, English language acquisition, cash assistance, and other
refugee services after a refugee has been resettled.

To begin the resettlement process, most refugees gain access to the USRAP by first fleeing
from their home country to a country of first asylum, such as Jordan or Syria, where they
register with the government or the UNHCR, or both, to seek protection. After registering
with the UNHCR, refugees who meet resettlement protection criteria may be referred to the
14

See Jeremy Sharp, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress
15 (2008) (finding that although Jordan has not generally welcomed Iraqi refugees or provided them with basic
legal protections such as legal residency, Jordan’s positive relationships with Western countries has enabled some
Iraqi refugees to access refugee assistance in Jordan).
15
For example, most Iraqi refugees in Jordan do not have the legal rights and privileges typically afforded refugees
in countries like the United States, as Jordan and Syria are not parties to the Refugee Convention. See AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, RHETORIC AND REALITY: THE IRAQI REFUGEE CRISIS (2008).
16
See Strengthening and Expanding Resettlement Today, supra note 13.
17
Id.
18
See B. S. Chimni, From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable Solutions
to Refugee Problems (May 1999), http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3ae6a0c50.pdf.
19
The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) [hereinafter Refugee Act]. The Refugee Act is
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1521 and in the Immigration and Nationality Act [hereinafter INA] §§ 411-414.
20
See Andorra Bruno and Katherine Bush, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS (1982); Maurice Roberts, The U.S. and Refugees: The Refugee Act of 1980, 12 ISSUE:
A JOURNAL OF OPINION ½ (1982).
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USRAP.21 Following referral from the UNHCR, the PRM contracts with Overseas Processing
Entities (OPEs) to conduct refugee intake interviews in the countries of first asylum.22 The
contracted OPE conducts a series of interviews to prepare a refugee’s persecution claim for
adjudication by the Refugee Corps.
Once refugees are approved by the Refugee Corps, the OPE ensures that they pass a
medical clearance, complete a security check, and that a volag can deliver the necessary
resettlement services in the United States.23 Volags are, for the most part, large, private,
not-for-profit organizations that are predominantly responsible for administering initial
Volag
reception and placement services and longer-term resettlement services.24
representatives meet every Wednesday at the Refugee Processing Center in Arlington,
Virginia to decide where in the United States to resettle approved cases.25 These decisions
are based on refugee biographical data collected by the OPE, which includes information on
family size, nationality, ethnicity, religion, and medical conditions.
The OPE coordinates refugee travel to the United States when it is notified that the refugee
passed both the medical check and security clearance, and that a volag has assured the
refugee’s placement.26 While refugees await departure, they attend an optional cultural
orientation, arranged by the PRM, but often conducted by organizations such as the IOM.27
Upon a refugee’s arrival in the United States, the first set of resettlement services falls
under the PRM’s Reception and Placement (R&P) program, which is designed to meet
refugees’ immediate needs during the first thirty days after arrival.28 In theory, refugees
simultaneously gain access to the ORR’s Refugee Assistance Program (RAP), which is
intended to provide cash and medical assistance to eligible refugees for at least the first
eight months after arrival, while they integrate into American society and search for
employment.29 Refugee Social Services (RSS), Targeted Assistance Grants (TAG), or the
Matching Grant (MG) program – all three of which are overseen by the ORR – can fund
employment training.30 The ORR also administers additional programs on an ad hoc basis to
facilitate refugee resettlement.31

21
Some refugees are able to directly apply to the U.S. government for resettlement and need not be registered
with UNHCR. This applies to those who meet the criteria of the priority two (P-2) processing category for Iraqis.
See Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, Public Law 110-181, 122 Stat. 3 (2008).
22
For most Iraqi refugees, the OPE is the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
23
David Martin, The United States Refugee Admissions Program: Reforms for a New Era of Refugee Resettlement,
137-143, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36495.pdf. Consider, for example, the
activities of IOM in Jordan. See IOM-Jordan webpage available at http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/424.
24
There are nine volags: Church World Services, Episcopal Migration Ministries, Ethiopian Community Development
Council, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, International Rescue Committee, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee
Service, U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops/Migration and Refugee
Service, and World Relief. One state, Iowa, runs its own refugee resettlement agency under the Iowa Department
of Human Services.
25
See 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(2) for placement guidelines and requirements.
26
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
27
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
28
See PRM’s Iraqi Refugee Assistance and Resettlement Webpage, http://www.state.gov/g/prm/c25771.htm (last
visited Sep. 29, 2009).
29
Congress also created Wilson-Fish programs to allow for ORR to contract directly with volags in states without
official refugee coordination. Wilson-Fish programs allow volags, some individual states, and other resettlement
agencies to apply directly to ORR for special funding. This funding is intended to assist refugees with selfsufficiency and integration through the creation of alternatives to the standard methods of dispersing public
assistance. See Wilson/Fish Amendment, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat 1837 (1984) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1522(e)(7)).
There are currently eleven states operating a Wilson-Fish program, as well as the county of San Diego in California.
30
45 C.F.R. §§ 400.154, 44.206.
31
Id. §§ 400.205, 400.207.
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Matching Grant
Under the MG program, a refugee receives a combination of cash assistance and
employment services over the course of four to six months, with the goal of using
employment as a means to achieving full economic self-sufficiency. The MG program is
funded through a combination of the volags’ own resources, which are then matched by the
ORR. The program is implemented by one of the nine volags through their networks of local
affiliates.
As the world’s largest resettlement program, the USRAP has a long history of offering a
fresh start for many of the world’s most vulnerable people, without discriminating on the
basis of race, religion, social or political affiliation, or educational or skill level. However,
the population it serves and the environment in which it functions have changed drastically
in the near thirty years since its creation. When the Refugee Act of 1980 was drafted, the
United States admitted a relatively homogenous group of refugees from Southeast Asia.32
The processing, cultural orientation, reception and placement, and resettlement services
programs were designed for a single population and its specific needs. Today, the United
States admits a culturally, religiously, and linguistically diverse caseload of refugees from
over sixty countries, all of whom have very particular and different histories of persecution
and needs.33 Nevertheless, the same one-size-fits-all system designed largely for Southeast
Asians is still in place, presenting distinct and novel challenges for the resettlement of new
populations entering the United States, including Iraqis.
The USRAP and the Iraqi Refugee Crisis
The UNHCR High Commissioner, Antonio Guterres, declared the Iraqi refugee crisis to be
“the most significant displacement in the Middle East” since the displacement of Palestinians
following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.34 With relatively little
displacement at the beginning of the Iraq war, the number of displaced Iraqis rose
dramatically after the February 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari mosque in Samarra, which
ignited sectarian and ethnic conflict throughout Iraq.35 The UNHCR and host governments
have estimated that a total of 4.5 million Iraqis have been displaced both inside Iraq and to
neighboring countries.36
In response, human rights and refugee advocacy groups asked the United States to provide
assistance and resettlement to displaced Iraqis.37 Many of the groups argued that the
United States had a particular responsibility to Iraqis given its role in the invasion of Iraq in

32

REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, HISTORY OF THE U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM,
http://www.rcusa.org/index.php?page=history.
33
See August 2009 Admissions Report, supra note 4.
34
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES , UNHCR’S ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION NEEDS OF IRAQI ASYLUM-SEEKERS 21 (2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=46deb05557.
35
Kelly O’Donnell and Kathleen Newland, Migration Policy Institute, The Iraqi Refugee Crisis: The Need for Action
(2008), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI-The_Iraqi_Refugee_Crisis_The_Need_for_Action_011808.pdf.
36
Host governments and UNHCR continue to cite this figure. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR
GLOBAL APPEAL 2009 UPDATE (2009). However, at the writing of this report many prominent authorities on the issue
estimate that Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons range in the hundreds of thousands, not millions.
37
See RefugeesInternational.org, Joint NGO Statement on Iraqi Refugee Needs (Jul. 25, 2007),
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/letter/joint-ngo-statement-iraqi-refugee-needs (last visited Oct. 5,
2009); Press Release, Refugee Council USA, Iraqi Refugees Require Urgent Protection and Assistance (May 21,
2007); Press Release, Amnesty International, Iraq: US, UK and other states must protect Iraqi refugees (Feb. 9,
2007).
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2003.38 Yet the United States responded very slowly to calls for resettlement, admitting
only 1,608 Iraqi refugees in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007.39
Under pressure from advocacy groups and increased reporting on the plight of Iraqi
refugees, the United States ultimately began resettling more Iraqis. In the fall of 2007,
Congress passed the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, providing admission for Iraqis that worked
for the United States or its contractors in Iraq, and allowing in-country processing for at-risk
Iraqis.40 In 2008, the United States appointed two Senior Coordinators for Iraqi Refugees,
one at the Department of State and one at the DHS, to strengthen the American
humanitarian commitment to refugees with a particular emphasis on resettlement.41 In FY
2008, the United States resettled 13,822 Iraqi refugees.42 As of August 31, 2009, the
United States has resettled 16,965 Iraqi refugees in FY 2009, totaling over 33,000 since the
2003 war.43 These refugees have been resettled throughout the United States, with some
of the largest populations in Detroit, Southern California, and D.C.44
With millions displaced and only a few thousand resettlement slots available worldwide, the
UNHCR developed 11 resettlement eligibility criteria for Iraqi refugees:
(1) Survivors of torture and violence, including sexual and gender based violence;
(2) Members of minority groups and persons targeted due to their ethnicity or sect;
(3) Women at risk in country of asylum;
(4) Unaccompanied or separate children;
(5) Dependents of refugees living in resettlement countries;
(6) Elderly refugees;
(7) Refugees with medical needs;
(8) High profile cases;
(9) Iraqis who fled due to their associations with U.S. or other foreign institutions;
(10) Stateless persons;
(11) Iraqis at risk of refoulement
When the U.S. government committed to resettle Iraqis, it essentially agreed to these
criteria. Yet the USRAP expects the most vulnerable refugees will find employment and
become self-sufficient almost immediately. Thus, the United States offers resettlement to
those refugees with particular vulnerabilities that can inhibit their ability to achieve selfsufficiency while expecting them to quickly become self-sufficient.
38
The List Project and Human Rights First were among the first organizations that advocated for those refugees
who faced persecution due to their affiliations with U.S. institutions in Iraq. See The List Project Website,
http://www.thelistproject.org; Kirk Johnson, Hounded by Insurgents, Abandoned by Us, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2007
(Mr. Johnson is the founder and executive director of The List Project; he was an early advocate for special
admission of Iraqis who helped the United States during the war and reconstruction efforts); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
PROMISES TO THE PERSECUTED: THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN IRAQ ACT OF 2008 (2009); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HOW TO CONFRONT
THE IRAQI REFUGEE CRISIS: A BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION (2008).
39
See August 2009 Admissions Report, supra note 4.
40
See Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, supra note 21.
41
See id.; Letter from Bill Frelick, Refugee Policy Director, and Tom Malinowski, Washington Advocacy Director,
Human Rights Watch, to Ambassador James B. Foley, Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugee Issues, Dep’t. of State,
and Lori Scialabba, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Sep. 24, 2007),
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/09/24/letter-ambassador-foley-and-lori-scialabba-iraqi-refugees.
42
See August 2009 Admissions Report, supra note 4.
43
Id. The total includes Iraqi refugees admitted in FY 2003, some of which were probably admitted before the Iraq
war began.
44
See Iraqi refugee arrivals by state tabulated on ORR’s website,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/data/refugee_arrival_data.htm; see also Detroit Expects Half of Iraqi
Refugees, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jun. 7, 2007; Hanna Ingbwer Win, Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Seeking Asylum
and a Better Life, California’s Iraqi Refugees Find Themselves in Limbo, LA WEEKLY, May 20, 2009 (stating that
5,000 new Iraqi refugees will arrive by the end of fiscal year 2009); see also Appendix II.
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The disconnect between the goals of refugee resettlement and how the USRAP operates in
practice has real effects on the lives of Iraqi refugees. As this report shows in Part III, Iraqi
refugees in countries of first asylum, such as Jordan, are making decisions about
resettlement to the United States in extremely difficult circumstances. Faced with poor
conditions in Amman and uncertainty about resettlement, many Iraqis question whether
resettlement to the United States is worth it. In Part IV, this report shows why Iraqi
refugees are justifiably skeptical of resettlement to the United States. The USRAP has failed
to promote their long-term self-sufficiency, and this failure has led to a new refugee crisis in
the very land that has been the destination of hope for many of the world’s most vulnerable
refugees.
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III. IRAQI REFUGEES ARE STILL IN DIRE NEED OF RESETTLEMENT
The case for resettlement must be considered in the context of the other two durable
solutions for Iraqi refugees: repatriation and integration in countries of first asylum.
On the first of these possible solutions, repatriation, international humanitarian groups
agree that Iraq is still not safe enough to allow return.45 And although some are returning,
there is “still no big flow back into Iraq.”46 The International Commission of the Red Cross
informally estimates the flow at close to one percent of the total refugee population and
believes that “most come in to look and see if its safe, if their property is still there, [and so
on], then quickly [go] back [to countries of asylum].”47 There are no credible reports of
Iraqi refugees returning home in significant numbers.48
Similarly, integration into countries of first asylum is a mere theoretical possibility for many
Iraqi refugees. The ability of Iraqi refugees to enjoy legal protection and long-term selfsufficiency in Jordan remains severely limited. The overwhelming majority of Iraqi refugees
interviewed in Jordan could not secure legal employment in the formal economy.49 Not all
Iraqi refugees are registered with the UNHCR, which compromises their ability to gain
access to assistance. Moreover, most Iraqi refugees in Jordan do not have access to
adequate legal protections such as residency, work permits, and police protection, and are
discriminated against, extorted, and abused as a result.
The inability of many Iraqi refugees to return to Iraq, combined with the dire situation they
face in places like Jordan, leaves resettlement to third countries like the United States the
only viable option. Some refugees, including particularly vulnerable refugees, are refusing
resettlement offers to the United States because of a perceived lack of post-resettlement
services; however, most Iraqi refugees we spoke to wanted to be resettled to the United
States.
A. Iraqi Refugees in Jordan Lack Basic Legal Protections
“How do you get by without jobs?” an interviewer asked Salim, an unemployed Iraqi
refugee living in Amman. “We sell property in Iraq. Some of us are receiving assistance
from relatives abroad. Some ‘volunteer’ and get paid without a contract. Others work
secretly but if caught, then they have problems. We know many who have been caught and
deported,” he said.50

45
This is most clearly shown by the fact that UNHCR, in revising their protection guidelines to exclude Iraqis from
Northern and Southern Iraq from the prima facie recognition procedure, stated, “It is UNHCR’s assessment that the
improvement of the situation in Iraq does not yet constitute fundamental changes… it is UNHCR’s recommendation
that individuals already benefiting from international protection, whether on a prima facie basis or following
individual status determination, should retain their status.” UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR’S
ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION NEEDS OF IRAQI ASYLUM-SEEKERS (2009) (emphasis
in original), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4a2640852&query=iraq.
46
Interview with Martin Thalmann, Deputy Head of Delegation, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Amman, Jordan (May
20, 2009).
47
Id.
48
See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, FACT SHEET: IRAQI REFUGEE RETURNS: NOT A SOLUTION RIGHT NOW (2008).
49
“Legitimate employment” refers to those who live and work in Jordan with legal residency and receive no
assistance. This describes only one person interviewed. See Interview with SALP 1, in Amman, Jordan. (May 23,
2009).
50
Interview with IKJG 3, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009).
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Of the twenty-nine Iraqi refugees interviewed in Jordan, only one had secured gainful legal
employment.51 Stories of “getting by” were commonplace;52 those who had savings were
hoping to be resettled before it was depleted.53 Many were dependent on assistance54 or
help from family outside Jordan.55
Among those few Iraqis who were able to work illegally, stories of discrimination were
common. Zainab and her daughter Razia fled to Amman but said they have found “no
security [there].” Only Razia found a job; however, this was working alongside a Jordanian
girl who was paid ten times Razia’s salary. “If an Iraqi is lucky enough to get a job,
employers will fire him or her for arbitrary reasons or pretexts,” said Zainab.56
Shaimaa, a woman in her twenties, also spoke to researchers about refugees’ vulnerabilities
in the workplace. Before fleeing Iraq, Shaimaa was a student and had completed two years
of college for graphic design. Because of her computer skills, she was able to find a job in
Amman as a typist in a lawyer’s office. When she went to a bank to cash her first check,
however, she was told that the check was deficient and could not be cashed. She was
saddened to have encountered such “oppression” while waiting for resettlement when, as
she says, “We have been so patient.”57 Given the sensitivity of the issue, fear of arrest, and
the fact that termination is used as a mechanism of control over those working illegally, it is
likely that refugees experience even more workplace discrimination than they reported to
the researchers.
Iraqi refugees living in Jordan lack many other basic legal protections as well. Only one of
the twenty-nine Iraqi refugees interviewed in Jordan had secured legal residency. One
international aid worker, emphasizing the difficult circumstances Iraqis faced, said “Jordan
is temporary. [Iraqi refugees] cannot get residency or full rights. They cannot work. [But
return to] Iraq is not an option.”58 Another aid worker called Jordan an “ambiguous legal
space,” emphasizing the unreliable nature of legal protections Iraqi refugees have there.59

51

Interview with SALP 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009).
Interview with DATO 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009) (stated that between the small stipend he gets from
his volunteer position and the cash assistance his family receives from UNHCR each month, he can just afford to
pay his rent).
53
Interview with DATO 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with IKSA 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 23,
2009); Interview with JGLP 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); Interview with DATO 4, in Amman, Jordan (May
23, 2009); Interview with SALP 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009).
54
Interview with IKJG 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 2, Amman, Jordan (May, 20,
2009); Interview with IKJG 3, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 4, Amman, Jordan (May 20,
2009); Interview with IKJG 5, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 6, Amman, Jordan (May 20,
2009); Interview with IKJG 7, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 8, Amman, Jordan (May, 20,
2009); Interview with IKJG 9, Amman, Jordan (May, 20, 2009); Interview with TODA 1, Amman, Jordan (May 21,
2009); Interview with TODA 2, Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 3, Amman, Jordan (May 21,
2009); Interview with TODA 4, Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 5, Amman, Jordan (May 21,
2009); Interview with TODA 6, Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 7, Amman Jordan (May 21,
2009); Interview with TODA 9, Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with IKJG 10, Amman, Jordan (May 22,
2009); Interview with DATO 1, Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with DATO 3, Amman, Jordan (May, 22,
2009); Interview with DATO 5, Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); Interview with JGLP 2, Amman, Jordan (May 23,
2009).
55
Interview with DATO 2, Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with IKSA 1, Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009);
Interview with JGLP 1, Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); Interview with DATO 4, Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009);
Interview with SALP 2, Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009).
56
Interview with TODA 5, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009).
57
Interview with TODA 4, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009).
58
Interview with Nour Sha’sha’a, Cmty. Mobilization & Outreach Coordinator, Save the Children, Amman, Jordan
(May 20, 2009).
59
Interview with Elizabeth Biermann, Int’l Catholic Migration Comm’n, Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009).
52
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Life without legal status presents dire risks. One aid worker reported hearing stories in
which a Jordanian bailed an Iraqi out of jail but kept the Iraqi’s passport, extorting money
until his case was resolved.60 Although Jordan has become much safer for Iraqis, many still
fear the police.61 One young Iraqi man said he heard a rumor that the Jordanian police
were assembling a special committee to deport Iraqis. “[It] makes me feel that the threat to
me in Jordan is equal to the threat I face[d] in Iraq because I can be sent back anytime the
Jordanian government pleases. And if that happens, I will be killed,” he said.62 Stories like
these show that even rumors and limited knowledge can have devastating effects, and that
the position of Iraqi refugees in countries of first asylum is tenuous.
Despite such challenges, only twenty-three of the twenty-nine Iraqi refugees interviewed
were registered with the UNHCR,63 which funds much of the assistance provided to refugees
in Jordan. By the end of 2008, over 50,000 Iraqi refugees were registered in Jordan, only a
fraction of the total Iraqi refugee population believed to be residing there.64 The UNHCR
and partner organizations use registration as an opportunity to connect refugees with
service providers and the registration data obtained to tailor assistance programs.65 For the
six unregistered Iraqi refugees researchers spoke to, and the thousands of others they did
not meet, access to assistance and services is quite limited.
B. Resettlement Remains an Imperfect but Important Choice for Iraqi Refugees
Given the difficulties Iraqi refugees face in countries of first asylum and the impossibility of
return to Iraq, resettlement remains an important option. For example, several Iraqi
refugees in Jordan emphasized that despite their concerns about the lack of support
available to refugees resettled in the United States, the formal legal status provided by the
U.S. resettlement system "made all of the difference."66 However, resettlement to the
United States, or another third country, is not a panacea to be pursued at the exclusion of
other durable solutions.
As Naima, a forty-five-year-old Iraqi refugee who speaks little English and was preparing to
be resettled in Arizona a month later, said, “I have lived through wars since I was thirteen.”
She was excited about Arizona because it is a desert “like Iraq” but summed up the
uncertainty she felt in coming to the United States:
60

Id.
Id.
62
Interview with JGLP 2, in Amman, Jordan. (May 23, 2009).
63
Interview with IKJG 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 20,
2009); Interview with IKJG 3, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 4, in Amman, Jordan (May
20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 5, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 6, in Amman, Jordan
(May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 7, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 8, in Amman,
Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 9, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with TODA 1, in
Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA
3, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 6, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with
TODA 9, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with DATO 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview
with DATO 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with DATO 3, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009);
Interview with DATO 4, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with Dato 5, in Amman, Jordan (May 22,
2009); Interview with SALP 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with SALP 2, in Amman, Jordan (May
22, 2009); Interview with JGLP 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); Interview with IKSA 1, in Amman, Jordan
(May 23, 2009).
64
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, IRAQI REFUGEE REGISTRATION DATA ANALYSIS 2007-2008 (2009)
[hereinafter UNHCR IRAQI REFUGEE DATA ANALYSIS REPORT].
65
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, STRATEGY FOR THE IRAQ SITUATION (2007), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/45b6258b4.pdf (stating that registration will enable UNHCR to determine
what other protection or assistance intervention may be required).
66
Interview with IKJG 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009). See also Interview with DATO 2, in Amman, Jordan
(May 22, 2009); Interview with DATO 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009).
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I am happy I will be in America because it will be safe and I will feel settled. But I
am scared. Where will I go if I am hungry? At least I know in Iraq, if I were hungry,
I could go knock on my neighbor’s door and ask for some food. But there, what can
I do? . . . I am going to the unknown. I may get there and think, Jordan is better for
me . . . .67
For many who enter the resettlement system, the process is further complicated by a
USRAP that seems labyrinthine and impersonal. One refugee, Hamza, told researchers, “At
all these meetings they never gave me any dates, just told me to wait for their call. At one
point I missed a call because I was in the bathroom and as a consequence my meeting got
postponed.”68 Although Hamza was eventually resettled to Maryland, the unpredictability of
the USRAP makes each stage more uncertain for those whose cases are being processed.
Some refugees have even declined offers of resettlement to the United States after hearing
stories of struggle and despair from family and friends already resettled there.69 As Riaz,
who has serious health issues, said, “I didn’t reject America because it is America. I
rejected it because the life is hard. We aren’t lazy people. I like to work.”70 Similarly, Riaz
believes that the limited health and employment assistance would not be enough to allow
him to live with his asthma. “If I can work, it would have to be behind a desk, and I don’t
know what options are available,” he explained.71 Of those who had refused or were
considering refusing resettlement to the United States, fear of inadequate support was
common.
Other refugees have declined to be resettled in the United States as a result of the trauma
of war. Amira said that many Iraqis see America as the occupier and that her son “would
shake from fear for a year from the American soldiers.”72 Amira also worries that a military
draft would force her or her children to fight against Muslims or Arabs.73 These sentiments
were echoed in several interviews with refugees in Amman, where despite a dire need for
assistance, some refugees found it difficult to see the United States as their protector.74
In the end, most refugees interviewed who were seeking resettlement wanted to go to the
United States, despite the risks.75 The fundamental hopefulness of stories like Naima’s
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Interview with TODA 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009).
Interview with IKSF 1, in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 13, 2009).
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Interview with IKJG 3, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 6, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009);
Interview with IKJG 9, Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with DATO 3, Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009);
Interview with DATO 4, Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009).
70
Interview with DATO 4, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009).
71
Id.
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Interview with TODA 9, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009).
73
Id.
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Id. (stated that people don’t want to go because they see America as the occupier); See also Interview with IKJG
2, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKGJ 3, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009).
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For the 14 of 20 refugees who wanted resettlement in the United States, see Interview with IKJG 4, in Amman,
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Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 3, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA
4, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with TODA 6, in Amman, Jordan (May 21, 2009); Interview with
DATO 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with DATO 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview
with DATO 5, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with SALP 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009);
Interview with SALP 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 22, 2009); Interview with IKJG 10, in Amman, Jordan (May 22,
2009); Interview with JGLP 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); Interview with JGLP 2, in Amman, Jordan (May
23, 2009). For those who either rejected an offer of resettlement from the United States or who would prefer to
accept an offer of resettlement to another country, see Interview with IKJG 3, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009);
Interview with IKJG 6, in Amman, Jordan (May 20, 2009); Interview with IKJG 9, in Amman, Jordan (May 20,
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show that resettlement is still a serious option and that vulnerable Iraqi refugees continue
to seek resettlement in the United States. At the same time, Naima’s story shows that
refugees are seriously considering whether to be resettled to the United States or remain in
Jordan under extremely difficult conditions. While the situation in Jordan is quite bad for
many Iraqi refugees, the news of struggling friends and family in the United States is
causing more and more Iraqi refugees to wonder whether choosing resettlement is really
worth the risk.

2009); Interview with IKSA 1, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009); Interview with DATO 3, in Amman, Jordan (May
22, 2009); Interview with DATO 4, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009).
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IV. THE USRAP DOES NOT PROVIDE A DURABLE SOLUTION FOR MOST IRAQI
REFUGEES
Despite the dire conditions in countries of first asylum, many Iraqi refugees who choose to
be resettled are also finding difficult conditions in the United States. Some resettled Iraqi
refugees said that their situation has gotten so bad that they feel they have no choice but to
leave the United States to return their country of first asylum. As this report illustrates, the
Iraqi refugee situation in the United States is the result of systemic flaws in the USRAP,
which generally inhibit the program’s ability to promote long-term self-sufficiency and
integration. For Iraqi refugees, promoting long-term self-sufficiency and integration means
providing adequate assistance of a sufficient duration in order to allow them to find and
keep meaningful employment. Promoting long-term self-sufficiency also means making
sure refugees have access to proper treatment for physical and mental health conditions.
When the USRAP does not adequately promote long-term self-sufficiency for resettled Iraqi
refugees, it not only fails to fulfill its moral obligations, but it also compromises its legal
obligations. International and domestic law generally require support for long-term selfsufficiency. For example, the Refugee Act was established in part to provide “for the basic
needs (including food, clothing, shelter, and transportation for job interviews and training)
of each refugee resettled . . . .”76 Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
guarantees all persons, including resettled refugees, “a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services.”77 The Refugee Convention and Protocol require
that refugees be provided adequate public assistance and social services.78
Despite such obligations, the research team found that the U.S. anti-poverty approach to
refugee resettlement adopted by the USRAP does not promote the long-term self-sufficiency
of refugees. It does not break down barriers to sustainable employment, employment
services are not properly funded, English language training is insufficient, transportation is
inadequate, and professional recertification is not viable. These shortcomings result in low
employment rates for Iraqi refugees. Cash assistance is insufficient, both in amount and
duration, to allow refugees to support themselves. Finally, the USRAP makes it difficult for
refugees to secure medical care, and treatment options are insufficient to address the
serious mental health issues affecting many Iraqis.
Furthermore, poor planning and coordination throughout the USRAP amplify the problems
that refugees face. The USRAP does not base funding on current or future refugee flows,
but on past refugee flows, leaving programs underfunded. Secondary migration is not
tracked in real-time, further preventing the USRAP from targeting resources to actual need
in secondary migration destinations. Pre-resettlement processing takes little account of
post-resettlement needs when gathering information about individual refugees.
A. The USRAP Does Not Adequately Promote the Long-Term Self-Sufficiency and
Integration of Iraqi Refugees
Most Iraqi refugees interviewed were struggling to become self-sufficient despite a strong
desire to work and provide for themselves and their families. As new arrivals in this
country, most lacked the necessary tools or skills, or both, to secure sustainable
76
77
78

INA § 412(b)(7)(D).
UDHR, supra note 7, art. 25.
Refugee Convention, supra 6, arts. 23-24.
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employment. Without adequate employment services, English language training, vocational
training, professional recertification, and transportation, obtaining and maintaining a job
was nearly impossible. In addition, the cash assistance received was not enough to cover
basic expenses and often ran out long before employment was secured. Although many of
the refugees interviewed had physical and mental health issues that were taken into
account when the United States decided to resettle them, they were not able to access
appropriate health care after they arrived.
Many Iraqi refugees in the United States are deeply worried about their futures. Some have
become homeless or face homelessness;79 others have recounted stories of Iraqis returning
to countries of first asylum in search of a sustainable life.80 With changes to the USRAP, the
circumstances of Iraqi refugees could be vastly improved.
i) Resettled Iraqi Refugees Want to Work, but the USRAP Is Not Providing Them with the
Necessary Tools to Secure Sustainable Employment
When researchers met Farrah, a former physical education teacher with a bachelor's
degree, she said that all she and her elderly mother hope for is “enough help to get on
[their] own two feet.”81 After fleeing from Iraq to Syria in 2007, Farrah arrived in Detroit in
June 2008 and has been trying unsuccessfully to find a job and enroll at a community
college to improve her employment prospects.82 “We don’t want to depend on the
government for everything,” Farrah said; “we want a foundation to build our own future.”83
Unfortunately for Farrah, and other Iraqi refugees with whom researchers spoke, the USRAP
does not devote enough attention to breaking down key barriers to employment for
refugees. Employment services, provided by volags and state agencies, are seriously
underfunded and unable to adequately help Iraqi refugees in their job search. Lack of
transportation remains a significant barrier to securing and maintaining employment.
English as a Second Language (ESL) classes, generally inadequate in both quality and
duration, fail to help Iraqis build marketable language skills. In addition, the opportunity to
pursue education and re-certification programs, prerequisites for many jobs, is either
unavailable or eclipsed by more immediate needs. Given these barriers, it is not surprising
that the vast majority of Iraqi refugees interviewed were unemployed despite expressing a
strong desire to work.
While the thirty-nine Iraqi refugees interviewed in Detroit had already lived in the United
States for an average of six and one-half months, only two had found employment.84 Many
complained that their attempts to secure employment remained fruitless. Caseworkers who
have worked with hundreds of Iraqi refugees confirmed that unemployment is pervasive and
has been increasing since the beginning of the economic downturn. Interviews with volags
in San Diego revealed that the employment rate for Iraqi refugees at the eight-month mark
has dropped from between sixty to seventy-five percent to twenty-five percent since mid-
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Interview with DHTO 1, in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 12, 2009); Interview with AWLP 1, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12,
2009); Interview with AWLP 2, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009).
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Interview with SALP 2, in Amman, Jordan (May 23, 2009).
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Interview with AWLP 1, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009).
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Many of the Iraqi refugees interviewed for this project were referred by volags and therefore may have been
more likely to be unemployed as they were still in contact with their volag caseworker. According to caseworkers
in Detroit, however, only about ten percent of all Iraqi refugees had found employment there.
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2008.85 The IRC, which conducted investigations in Atlanta and Phoenix, similarly reported
unusually high levels of unemployment amongst Iraqi refugees.86
As the situation worsens for Iraqi refugees, they continue to express a desire to work and
become self-sufficient. An Iraqi family of five in Detroit provides a telling example. Mr.
Aboud, a 50-year-old father and veterinarian who translated for the U.S. military in Iraq,
and Mrs. Aboud, a 50-year-old mother and physician, have both been told by their volag
caseworker that they are too old and overqualified for the few jobs available, despite their
willingness to work for minimum wage in any capacity.87 They bought a car and enrolled in
the MG program, but they were nevertheless told that their job search would be fruitless.88
Still, they were not deterred. “I can work as an assistant or a caregiver,” said Mr. Aboud; “I
don’t care.”89
But Mr. and Mrs. Aboud, and the many other Iraqi refugees who, like them, are new to the
United States, must be given the tools necessary to become self-sufficient. They need
access to meaningful, well-funded employment services, adequate English language
training, vocational training or professional re-certification, and reasonable transportation
options. The USRAP does not currently provide Iraqi refugees with sufficient access to these
basic services, creating barriers to long-term self-sufficiency and integration.
a) Underfunded and Misguided Employment Services
“We need more funding, that’s the key,” said Belmin Pinjic, Director of Refugee Services at
Lutheran Social Services of Michigan (LSSM), which implements the ORR’s employment
services grant. Pinjic emphasized that the issue is not only a dearth of available jobs in
today’s fragile economy but also the lack of quality services for refugees.90 “We can’t
change the economy, but if we have appropriate funding, we can have more frontline people
that provide adequate services,” said Pinjic.91 And this, he concluded, is what will help Iraqi
refugees get jobs.92
Last year, LSSM received funding to provide employment services for 300 refugees, but
ended up serving more than 1,200; the average caseload per caseworker increased from 30
to 120 refugees.93 One LSSM caseworker interviewed had 180 open cases.94 As a result of
large caseloads, caseworkers are more inclined to provide cursory services when helping
refugees search for employment.95
The inadequate funding of employment services has real effects on a refugee’s ability to
secure employment. Aseil and her husband, Fiaz, who resettled in the D.C. area, described
their employment services caseworker as a kind and friendly woman. However, Aseil said
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her caseworker “doesn’t have enough time to handle all the required tasks.”96
Consequently, Aseil has been trying to look for jobs on her own, but she does not know
where to look.97 Fiaz, who used to work for the United Nations, reported that despite his
repeated requests for help with his job search, his caseworker has done little more than
help him draft a resume.98 Instead, Fiaz has heard about job opportunities from friends.99
“I’ll take any job I can get,” said Fiaz; “I just want to be self-sufficient.”100
b) Lack of Adequate English Language Training
Shada, who fled Iraq after her husband was killed while working with the U.S. military, has
a bachelor’s degree in computer science.101 With three children to raise on her own, she
has no time to pursue professional re-certification.102 Instead, she says that she would be
happy to work at the front desk of a hotel, if only her English was good enough.103
Many Iraqi refugees, including Shada, told researchers that if they could only speak English
well, they would have a real chance at getting a job.104 Similarly, refugee caseworkers cited
lack of English language skills as the number one reason Iraqi refugees are unable to secure
sustainable employment. Moreover, statistical analyses of refugee resettlement in Houston,
Miami, and Sacramento, have shown that refugees arriving with English language skills tend
to have increased incomes, as do refugees who receive ESL services.105
U.S. regulations set aside specific funding for English language training and require that it
be provided to the maximum extent feasible, in a manner that is culturally and linguistically
compatible with a refugee's language and cultural background.106 But in reality, refugees
have difficulty accessing English language training, the quality of instruction is poor, and
there are simply not enough classes available for all refugees.
In Detroit, LSSM only has enough funding to start new ESL courses every four months.
Therefore, newly-arrived refugees commonly wait two or three months before beginning
classes.107 These classes are only available to a minority of the incoming refugee
population; there are just 325 seats available due to funding based on the area’s relatively
small refugee population prior to the recent wave of Iraqi arrivals.108 Those refugees lucky
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enough to enroll in the LSSM courses only have two hours of class, two to three days a
week for three months.109 This is hardly enough to prepare refugees for employment.
Moreover, the quality English language training available often prevents refugees from
acquiring a working knowledge of English. “ESL classes need to be better,” said the director
of U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants in Detroit, a volag affiliate, who worries
that Iraqi refugees are being turned away from jobs because they do not speak English
well.110 Many ESL instructors are volunteer teachers without a prepared curriculum,
classroom discussions are often conducted in Arabic instead of English, and learning
materials fail to take into account the limited literacy of students in any language, even
Arabic.111
The USRAP could do better. By comparison, the Australian government funds an Adult
Migrant English Program (AMEP), which guarantees 610 hours of free English classes to
refugees, and 910 hours to refugees under the age of twenty-five with low levels of
schooling.112 All migrants who do not have functional English, including refugees, must
register for AMEP within three months of arriving in Australia and must begin classes with
twelve months at one of nearly 250 AMEP locations.113 To meet the unique needs of
refugees and other migrants, AMEP classes can be taken at home through either a distance
learning curriculum or one-on-one home tutoring by trained volunteers.114 The Australian
government also funds a twenty-four-hour translation and interpretation hotline that is free
when communicating with government, healthcare, and non-profit service providers.115 The
hotline provides access to over 1,300 interpreters who speak over 120 languages.116
c) Reasonable Transportation Options Not Available
Suri, an Iraqi refugee resettled in Detroit, had been a seamstress in Iraq and was fortunate
to land an interview for a housekeeping job.117 Unfortunately, she was unable to arrange
transportation to the interview, and she lost a rare opportunity.118 Like many resettled Iraqi
refugees, Suri has found the lack of adequate transportation to be a major barrier to
achieving self-sufficiency.
Even if English classes and job opportunities were widely available, many refugees would
have great difficulty getting to them.119 The ORR guidelines require that volag caseworkers
109
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provide transportation, but resources are sparse, particularly in Detroit and San Diego, the
two cities receiving the most Iraqi refugees. 120 Making matters worse, public transportation
is extremely limited in these two cities. Consequently, refugees are forced to constantly
rely on friends and family, often refugees themselves, to drive them. One caseworker said
that some Iraqi refugees are so desperate to get to their jobs that they pay people to drive
them.121
Obtaining a driver’s license was especially problematic for many of the refugees in this
study.122 One caseworker reported that it takes two to five months to get a license, with
the extensive delay often due to inconsistent romanization of Arabic names on U.S.-issued
identification, such as the employment-authorization document.123 A single misspelled
letter of a refugee’s name on a particular document can delay the process for months.124
Inconsistency between travel documents sometimes requires refugees to wait for their
employment authorization before they can obtain a driver’s license, forcing refugees into a
Catch-22, as they cannot find employment without being able to drive to job interviews.
Adapting to the Circumstances
LSSM is currently applying for supplemental funding for a shuttle bus program, whereby
vans and drivers would be available to take refugees to job interviews, English language
classes, health screenings, and to apply for Social Security numbers.125 ACCESS, a
community service provider in Detroit, has also applied for an Ethnic Community Self-Help
Grant to use in part for transportation; however, funding for such programs is extremely
limited.126
d) Little Access to Vocational Training and Re-Certification
Hamza, an Iraqi refugee resettled in D.C., was told in Jordan that recertification would be
easy. "As a doctor, I know that I have to go through a recertification process in order to
work,” Hamza said.127 “I asked them about getting recertified as a doctor, [and] [t]hey told
me I could easily get a job in my field," he further explained.128 After Hazma arrived in the
United States, his volag told him to get his credentials reviewed by the World Education
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Services (WES), which he did for a fee of $400.129 It turned out, however, that the
Education Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) does not accept WES
verifications, so the $400 was wasted. Instead, ECFMG requires candidates to pay an initial
registration fee of $700 and to complete three stages of verification within five years.130
The first stage is an exam that costs $825; the second, an exam that costs $1200; and the
third stage includes a residency period and another exam.131 For Hamza, the re-certification
process proved too difficult and expensive to pursue.132
The USRAP’s focus on immediate employment incentivizes caseworkers to push Iraqi
refugees towards lower-paying and less sustainable jobs, irrespective of the refugee’s
professional and educational accomplishments. Moreover, the limited duration of public
assistance makes pursuing recertification, vocational training, and higher education
untenable without financial aid from the government. But for those few people who do seek
recertification, vocational training, or higher education the payoff can be great.
ii) The USRAP Is Not Providing Iraqi Refugees with Adequate Cash Assistance While They
Search for Sustainable Employment
In 2006, Haifa’s husband and son were kidnapped in Iraq because of their religion, forcing
Haifa to flee to Jordan.133 In March, Haifa, in her early fifties, faced yet another seemingly
insurmountable challenge: having resettled in Detroit nearly eight months prior, her modest
cash assistance through the USRAP was to expire in April.134 Taking care of her elderly
mother, who was resettled with her, Haifa did not have a job, did not speak English, and did
not have access to reliable transportation.135 She was already relying on relatives to help
pay for her basic expenses, and Haifa did not know what would happen once the refugee
assistance payments stopped. “We [have already] lost everything,” she said frankly.136
“Give us more than eight months to build our lives.”137
If Iraqi refugees desire self-sufficiency, why is the system not working? On its face, the
USRAP is intended to assist refugees with their basic needs for as long the government
deems it necessary in order “to achieve economic self-sufficiency.”138 Indeed, at its
inception, and in the midst of a prolonged recession, the USRAP assisted Vietnamese
refugees for thirty six months. The results speak for themselves: by 2007, the median
household income for Vietnamese Americans – the large majority of whom entered the
United States as refugees – was $54,871. In the same year, only 3.2% of Vietnamese
American households were receiving cash public assistance.139 In addition, the hundreds of
thousands of Vietnamese refugees who were assisted for thirty six months in the 1970s and
1980s were able to pursue opportunities for upward mobility, knowing their families would
be cared for. Today, forty-one percent of Vietnamese Americans have either some college

129

Id.
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Interview with AWLP 1, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 11 2009).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
INA § 412 (a)(1)(A)(i).
139
U.S. Census Bureau (data extracted from 1-year American Community Survey), available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en. Approximately two-thirds of all Vietnamese
Americans entered the U.S. as refugees. See SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOURCE ACTION CENTER, SOUTHEAST ASIAN AMERICAN
STATISTICAL PROFILE (2004), available at http://www.searac.org/seastatprofilemay04.pdf.
130

25

education or an associate’s degree, and twenty-seven percent, just half a percent below the
national average, hold at least a bachelor’s degree.140
Despite this past model, which laid a foundation for the success of Vietnamese refugees,
today’s refugees are expected to achieve self-sufficiency while facing another prolonged
recession in eight months and with minimal assistance.141 This short period of assistance
reflects the overwhelming emphasis on immediate employment in the Refugee Act and its
subsequent implementation through anti-poverty programs such as Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families (TANF) and Medicaid. However, modeling refugee assistance on antipoverty programs is misguided. Refugees who have fled persecution in foreign countries
face an utterly different set of challenges than do U.S. residents struggling with poverty. In
addition to struggling with poverty themselves, refugees must rebuild their lives in a foreign
country, learn a new language and adapt to a new way of life. Iraqi refugees, in particular,
often arrive to find that their educational degrees are useless and years of professional
experience are of no value.
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Not Even Eight Months
Although the Refugee Act calls for up to thirty six months of assistance, refugees today
often receive fewer than eight months. In Michigan, a refugee who goes to the Department
of Human Services (DHS) on the day of her arrival must wait at least ten days for an
appointment with a Refugee Specialist who can open her case. If the refugee has
satisfactorily completed the application form, her case may be opened that day, but the
DHS policy requires an additional thirty-day wait before any payments can be sent to the
refugee. When the refugee receives her first payment forty days after arriving, it does not
include back payment for those forty days. In the best-case scenario, a refugee in Michigan
receives a maximum of approximately six months and ten days of cash assistance.142
However, the DHS often does not immediately open the case and begin the thirty-day count
because refugees are hesitant to include all the requisite information on the application form
when they are living with family or friends who are also refugees. These host families—
many of whom are refugees and receive their own Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) or TANF
benefits—believe they will lose their assistance if the family staying with them includes their
address and other information on the application form. If information is missing on the
application form, the DHS delays opening a refugee’s case despite the fact that the
information is readily available in its own database. DHS Refugee Specialists have also
reported delays as a result of private agents who falsely promise new refugees a faster
turnaround in the processing of their cases.
By contrast, refugees placed in San Diego are resettled under the Wilson-Fish program,
which gives volags full responsibility and funding to provide the first eight months of
services and cash assistance. State agencies already overburdened with serving longtime
state residents are not further inundated with refugee caseloads, assistance is available to
refugees from day one, and volags are able to utilize the full extent of the ORR funding, as
opposed to state and county agencies where ten to fifteen percent of federal funds are used
for administrative costs.143 While longer periods of assistance are needed, such programs
avoid some of the problems refugees face in other regions.
Many Iraqi refugees facing the prospect of life without a job worry about how they are going
to survive on the minimal government assistance provided. The Attars, a family of six, live
in a humble apartment just outside Detroit.144 Their oldest son attends English classes, but
because he is a legal adult at the age of nineteen, the Attars now only qualify for the level
of assistance assigned to a family of five under TANF. Receiving approximately $700 per
month, the Attars can barely afford their $600 monthly rent, not including utilities.145
Although the Attars receive some help from their local church and bishop in the form of food
baskets and furniture, it is certainly not enough to pay for another expense common to all
refugees resettled here: the $175 they owe each month to reimburse IOM for their airline
tickets from Syria to the United States.146
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As it exists now, the total package of assistance to refugees amounts to between just
seventeen to forty percent of the federal poverty line.147 Although a family of six may
receive up to $2,500 in R&P assistance to cover living costs for the first ninety days, a single
adult receives only $425, or less than $5 a day.148 Refugees who do not have family
already in the United States sometimes do not receive any direct R&P cash assistance
because volags can use that money to pay the first-month housing expenses.149 In some
cases, these refugees leave their initial housing situation because they find the living
situation culturally untenable; one mother and her young daughter left their initial housing
placement because the mother believed it was inappropriate for them to share a bathroom
with eight other refugees, some of whom were adult males from different countries.150 In
such cases, the R&P assistance used to pay their rent cannot be recovered.
As the Attars’ situation illustrates, cash assistance, either through RCA or TANF, is also
insufficient. A family of five in Detroit will receive $698 per month, but they are forced to
pay a $600 rent to comply with local housing laws that require five people to live in a threebedroom home.151 In San Diego, a family of four receives $862 per month, but the rent for
a two-bedroom apartment is $850.152 Similarly, a 2008 ORR report found that refugees
living in communities that provide low welfare benefits, such as Houston and Miami, “cannot
subsist on public assistance.”153 Without the ability to save money, refugees then struggle
to cover important incidental costs, such adjusting to legal permanent resident status.154
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The Right to Adequate Housing
Article 25 of the UDHR provides that “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood
in circumstances beyond his control.”155 Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes “the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing,
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.”156
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, who authoritatively interprets the
ICESCR, has defined these provisions, in which the right to adequate housing is embedded,
to include several core elements. Among them are:157
• Affordability: “Personal or household financial costs associated with housing should be at
such a level that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened
or compromised.”158
• Location: “[A]dequate housing must be in a location which allows access to employment
options, health-care services, schools, child-care centers and other social facilities. This
is true both in large cities and in rural areas where the temporal and financial costs of
getting to and from the place of work can place excessive demands upon the budgets of
poor households.”159
iii) The USRAP Is Not Providing Adequate Medical Care to Resettled Refugees, Further
Undermining Their Ability to Secure Long-term Self-sufficiency
Just as refugees receive only eight months of cash assistance, so too are they limited to
eight months of medical coverage under Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA).160 This is
problematic not only because many refugees are unable to find jobs in eight months, but
also because they often face unique medical needs that do not go away when they are able
to support themselves.161 Indeed, Iraqi refugees need access to quality health care that will
cover treatment for long-term physical ailments, as well as the serious mental health issues
that many of them face.
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a) Inadequate Access to Medical Care
Seema is a 56-year-old self-described optimist from northern Iraq who has grown to love
Michigan.162 She has a heart problem, high cholesterol, rheumatism, and no medical
coverage because her RMA expired after eight months.163 Her elderly husband is also sick,
and their adult son earns minimum wage.164 But still, Seema is lucky: hers is one of the
few Iraqi refugee families with any wage at all, not to mention her husband’s social security
benefits.165 She only asks for her medical coverage to be restored. “We can handle
everything else,” said Sema.166 Seema’s story is illustrative of a broader phenomenon:
healthy Iraqi refugees, just like healthy Americans, are better positioned to find and keep
jobs, and tend to perform better in their jobs.
A recent UNHCR study of active Iraqi refugee cases reported that between twenty-five and
forty-one percent of registered Iraqi refugees have an “important medical condition.”167
Moreover, the coordinator of the ACCESS Community Health Clinic reported that many Iraqi
refugees suffer from chronic conditions, like diabetes, that require regular treatment.168
Still, the USRAP makes little effort to address these specific and often long-term healthcare
needs. Adult refugees without dependent children stand on the edge of a particularly steep
cliff at the eight-month mark because they cannot extend their medical coverage by
transferring to Medicaid, which only covers families with dependent children.
The same problems that plague other elements of the USRAP are especially acute when it
comes to medical treatment. Refugee service providers reported that many Iraqi refugees
are unable to fill out application or renewal forms in English,169 and some had missed
appointments for check-ups and medical procedures because they simply had no means of
getting to them.170 As when applying for cash assistance, many Iraqi refugees who live with
other refugee families are hesitant to apply for medical coverage because host families are
worried their own coverage will then be discontinued.171 In such cases, a refugee may
postpone treatment of urgent healthcare needs until she can obtain her own living
arrangements.
Misinformation and administrative hurdles also prevent refugees from accessing a full eight
months of healthcare coverage. Both refugees and healthcare providers are often unaware
that Medicaid coverage applies even before a refugee has received her Medicaid card.172
This is dangerously problematic for the large number of Iraqi refugees who have existing
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medical conditions when they arrive but are unable to seek treatment, except in emergency
rooms. To make matters worse, medical coverage in Michigan begins not on the day of
arrival, but rather on the first day of the month of arrival. For a refugee who arrives in the
United States on June 30, her coverage is considered to have begun on June 1, thereby
cutting one of the eight months of eligibility for medical assistance.173
The Attar family, for example, was unable to access Medicaid until a full two months after
they arrived in the United States.174 Having initially moved in with relatives, they hesitated
to apply for Medicaid because their relatives were on public assistance and were afraid of
losing their own benefits if the Attars used their home address to apply.175 With two discs
removed from his spine, Mr. Attar applied for disability support, but his doctor told him to
come back in six months to receive the necessary disability referral.176 When the Attars’
son turned nineteen, he no longer qualified for the family’s Medicaid coverage and cash
assistance, and they worry that the same will happen to their eighteen-year-old daughter,
who has a medical condition.177
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health
Several human rights instruments guarantee the right to the highest attainable standard of
health. Chief among these is the UDHR, which provides that “[e]veryone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the
right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”178 The ICESCR, another core
human rights document, provides “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health.”179 In General Comment 14, the ICESCR
Committee, which interprets the treaty, defined this right to include several core elements,
including physical accessibility. According to the Committee, “health facilities, goods and
services must be within safe physical reach for all sections of the population, especially
vulnerable or marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities and indigenous populations,
women, children, adolescents, older persons, persons”180
The right is also identified in of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),181 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),182 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC).183

173

See, e.g., Interview with AWLP 2, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 11, 2009).
Interview with KSGP/RW 1, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 11, 2009).
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
UDHR, supra note 7.
179
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Art. 12(1), Dec. 16, 1966.
180
Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard
of Health (Art. 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/4, (2000). available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/40d009901358b0e2c1256915005090be?Opendocument.
181
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art. 5(e)(iv), Dec. 21, 1965.
182
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Art. 11(1)(f), 12, Dec. 18, 1979.
183
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 24, Nov. 20, 1989. The United States has signed the CRC but has not
yet ratified it.
174

31

b) Inadequate Treatment for Mental Health Issues
Saeed lives in Detroit now, but the scars around his ankles are a constant reminder of the
repeated torture and electric shocks he suffered in Iraq. 184 Saeed is not alone; every year,
thousands of refugees arrive in the United States with mental health needs, but every year,
federal funding under the Torture Victims Relief Act is insufficient.185 This is particularly
troubling since the very fact of being a torture victim is what qualifies many refugees for
resettlement in the United States.
A study conducted by the United Nations in Syria concluded that one in five Iraqi refugees
are victims of torture or traumatic violence, seventy-seven percent have been affected by
bombings, eighty percent have witnessed a shooting, and seventy-five percent “knew
someone who had been killed.”186 Interviews conducted for this report confirmed this high
incidence of traumatic experience and associated mental health conditions. A doctor who
carries out refugee medical assessments in Detroit estimated that seventy-five percent of
Iraqi refugees he sees have mental health issues.187 A refugee specialist at the ACCESS
Community Health and Research Center in Dearborn, Michigan, told us that seventy to
seventy-five percent of Iraqi refugees show signs of mental health issues such as insomnia
or the post-trauma effects of having witnessed a shooting.188
And yet in many cases, refugees’ mental health needs remain untreated, compromising
their ability to lead healthy, functional lives. In San Diego, for example, refugees with
lingering mental health problems can wait two months before seeing a doctor.189 Similarly,
torture treatment centers in the eight states with the highest number of Iraqi refugee
arrivals are experiencing waitlists for their services.190 Other areas where Iraqi refugees are
expected to resettle in greater numbers, such as Idaho, Tennessee, and upstate New York,
do not have any dedicated torture treatment centers and will therefore require additional
funding for training and capacity-building.191 This lack of adequate funding allows for only a
very rudimentary mental health assessment to be conducted at a refugee’s initial health
screening. In Dearborn, the only available practitioner to conduct the assessment was a
volunteer medical intern.192
Additional barriers to treating torture survivors and those with serious mental health issues
exist. A community health professional said that medical records she received are often
illegible or otherwise useless for identifying mental health issues.193 Also, Iraqis often

184

Interview with RWGP 3, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 10, 2009).
Torture Victims Relief Act, 22 U.S.C. 2152 (2003). The Center for Victims of Torture estimates that the TVRA
will need at least an additional $14 million dollars above the President’s budget request to meet the severe mental
health requirements of the influx of Iraqi refugees. See Center for Victims of Torture Website,
http://www.cvt.org/page/40.
186
One in five Iraqi refugees in Syria suffered from torture or violence in Iraq. See Press Release, United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees Trauma Survey in Syria Highlights Suffering of Iraqi Refugees (Jan. 22, 2008),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/479616762.html.
187
Interview with Doctor, Arab Cmty. Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Serv. Cmty. Health & Research Ctr, in Detroit, Mich.
(Mar. 12, 2009).
188
Interview with Shorouq Shenaq, Arab Cmty. Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Serv. Cmty. Health & Research Ctr, in
Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009).
189
Interview with San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Jul. 16, 2009).
190
See Center for Victims of Torture Website, http://www.cvt.org/page/40.
191
Id.
192
Interview with Shorouq Shenaq, Arab Cmty. Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Serv. Cmty. Health & Research Ctr, in
Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009).
193
Interview with Michele Wells, Director of Human Resources, Arab Cmty. Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Serv. Cmty.
Health & Research Ctr, in Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 12, 2009).
185

32

stigmatize individuals thought to have mental health issues and community outreach efforts
are only beginning to educate this population about the merits of treatment.194
Refugee service providers acknowledge that until refugees’ basic needs – including housing,
employment, and transportation – are met, a focus on mental health is likely to remain
elusive. But meeting those basic needs will do little good if a refugee’s untreated mental
health condition keeps her from making the most of the opportunities provided by
resettlement. The only way around this closed loop is a well-funded resettlement program
that acknowledges and addresses the connection between a refugee’s physical and mental
health and her long-term self-sufficiency.
B. The USRAP Is Compromised by a Lack of Strategic Planning and Coordination
Every Wednesday in a conference room in Arlington, Virginia, representatives of the volags
gather to decide where in the United States each refugee in the resettlement queue will
begin his or her new life. The discussion is broad, taking into account the circumstances of
each refugee family as well as local and national capacity. Like other key moments in the
resettlement process, the information and procedures that lead to or are contingent upon
these decisions implicate everyone in the system. Though all actors in the resettlement
process work hard to fulfill their respective mandates, by the time the futures of Iraqi
refugees are decided in multi-round draft-picks in Arlington, key information is often left by
the wayside and important opportunities for planning and coordination are missed or
ignored.
Researchers identified a number of problems with the planning and execution of the USRAP
that have a deep impact on refugee self-sufficiency. The USRAP is marked by limited
strategic planning across and among different parts of the system, and funding and
placement mechanisms are not flexible enough to anticipate or react to the changing needs
of refugee populations. There are no adequate mechanisms in place for anticipating
foreseeable trends in secondary migration, and information about vulnerabilities impacting
refugees after resettlement is either not gathered or not shared. Such shortfalls place
needless limitations on actors, such as those who attend the weekly placement meeting in
Arlington, and prevent the system from adequately serving the vulnerable refugees that the
system is designed to protect. As a result, refugees resettled to the United States often
suffer at all stages of the process.
i) USRAP Funding Decisions Are Reactive, Not Proactive
The recent arrival of Iraqi refugees is the most glaring example to date of the USRAP’s
inability to anticipate future needs. When the U.S. government announced in 2007 that
tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees would soon be arriving in the United States, there was
little doubt that Iraqis would seek to be placed in cities with large existing Iraqi and Arab
communities like Detroit and San Diego. Even those working in overseas processing
predicted as much.195 While the OPEs provide quarterly arrival projections to the PRM, this
data is not shared with the ORR for purposes of capacity setting.196
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Moreover, the formula for resource allocation precludes any such planning, even if it were to
take place.197 Federal funding for social services and employment programs through RSS
and TAG is dictated by the number of refugee arrivals over the previous three or five years,
respectively.198 The retroactive nature of this formula funding prevents resources from
reaching localities with abrupt increases in refugee placement. For example, San Diego
received approximately 1,500 new refugees each fiscal year before 2008; it is now on track
to receive over 5,200 in both FY 2009 and FY 2010, over ninety-five percent of whom are
Iraqi.199 Meanwhile, the number of arrivals for the state of Michigan increased 400% from
FY 2006 to FY 2008.200 Arrivals to Detroit, all Iraqis, increased by over 1500% for that same
period.201 But funding for refugee social services only increased by approximately seventytwo percent from FY 2007 to FY 2009.202 Because arrivals levels from previous years bind
the formula funding, funding commensurate to these new caseloads will not arrive until
2011.
In the meantime, the ORR’s support for these struggling locales remains based on the
fiction that they are serving the number of refugees that arrived in 2006 or 2007. This
systemic delay has a serious impact on the ability of service providers to assist refugees,
and the consequences are dire for refugees. In some cases, volag staff have become
responsible for as many as 100 cases at a time, representing three or four times the
number of clients they had just a few years ago.203 As noted above, the additional strain on
a caseworker’s time means that individualized attention is nearly impossible to provide,
contributing to a threefold drop in employment rates in Detroit.204
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What a Difference a Year Makes
In light of the sudden arrival of thousands of new Iraqi refugees in Detroit, the state of
Michigan recalibrated the statewide distribution of limited state resources provided by the
ORR. Although the total amount of federal funding did not adjust quickly enough to cope
with Detroit’s new arrivals, the state refugee coordinator took the initiative of allocating
funding for employment services among counties according to levels from the previous
year, instead of the previous three years. This shifted the available resources to the
employment services in Detroit run by LSSM, away from programs elsewhere in the state
that had a lesser relative need.
With the new source of funds, LSSM was able to double the number of caseworkers
committed to employment services, which increased the employment placement rate by
fifty percent from the last trimester of FY 2008 to the first trimester of FY 2009.205
ii) USRAP Does Not Adequately Account for Secondary Migration
The initial placement decisions for resettled refugees have a significant impact on refugees’
long-term self-sufficiency and the efficiency of the program as a whole. And although the
PRM, the ORR, and volags each impose their own restrictions on placement, no one agency
is responsible for refugee placement as a whole, which directly affects refugees’ ability to
integrate into their new communities.
When refugees are haphazardly placed in communities that lack the necessary resources or
social supports, barriers to employment become even more pronounced. If refugees
relocate to other cities seeking more support or better job opportunities, resettlement
assistance often lags behind or becomes difficult to access. Such was the case for the
majority of Iraqi refugee secondary migrants interviewed in Detroit, who spent an average
of fifty days at their initial placement before moving to Detroit.206 Some of these refugees
never received their full R&P assistance.207 Without an effective tracking system for
information sharing between states, volags, the PRM and the ORR, refugees must take the
initiative to find new social service providers and act to transfer their own cash and medical
assistance from one state to another. When they move, refugees get lost in the system,
losing at least part of their eight months of cash and medical assistance.
With regard to offsetting the effect that secondary migration has on the destination state’s
resources, there is simply no system-wide tracking mechanism, even though it is an entirely
predictable and regular occurrence. The PRM does not track secondary migration because it
is “not part of their mandate.”208 The ORR attempts to track secondary migration after the
R&P period through a state reporting mechanism, but it suffers from a delay that renders
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the information futile; by the time the ORR registers one set of secondary migrants, a new
set has already arrived.209
Meanwhile, states are left to depend on each other to determine when a case from another
state requires immediate follow-up. Volags such as LSSM have tried to collect the names of
secondary migrants when they arrive, but as the director of LSSM’s refugee service said,
there is simply no way to know whether its register of over 200 secondary migrants
represents five or ninety percent of the total population.210 Undoubtedly, these refugees
place additional strain on already overburdened service networks.
iii) The USRAP Fails to Identify and Communicate Vulnerabilities in Overseas Processing
Many of the problems that plague the placement process are rooted in a breakdown of
information-sharing across various agencies involved in the USRAP. Iraqis being processed
for U.S. resettlement speak with representatives at the UNHCR, IOM, and DHS before
getting on a flight to the United States. Nonetheless, there is neither a single mechanism
for prioritizing cases for expedited processing nor a procedure for recording needs that will
impact refugees after arrival. In some cases, information is gathered that is not shared
with agencies further down the resettlement chain, increasing the likelihood that refugee
needs will not be met.
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Disjunction between Resettlement and Assistance
Refugee survivors of torture in Amman find themselves in a unique situation: they can be
identified and treated as a survivor of torture without information about their special needs
ever reaching the other side of the Atlantic once they are resettled.
In October, 2008, the Center for Victims of Torture (CVT) received funding, primarily from
the PRM and U.N. to open a torture-treatment center for Iraqi refugees. CVT clinicians
spend months developing relationships and working with survivors of torture and trauma. 211
“It takes seven to nine sessions to build enough trust for [our] clients to open up about
these experiences.”212 Victimization rates among Iraqis are disproportionately high, even
for refugees fleeing conflict, but the CVT believes survivors are unlikely to be forthcoming
with the UNHCR or IOM interviewers about their experience.213
Furthermore, panel
physicians designated by the Centers for Disease Control to evaluate immigrants moving to
the United States are unlikely to report anything other than direct physical evidence of
torture.214 Thus it is likely that many survivors of torture pass unidentified through the
USRAP.
Even after they develop this rapport, get details, and begin treatment, however, CVT, an
organization that runs torture treatment programs in the United States, is unable to follow
up on these cases post-resettlement. As the Jordan country director put it, “[we] are only
really equipped to do email and telephone outreach on individual clients’ behalf on the basis
of personal relationships.”215
In spite of the fact that the treatment program is a PRM-supported initiative, there is no
coordination between assistance and resettlement. There is no formal mechanism for
information about these survivors of torture and trauma to be fed into the resettlement
system. While the CVT “could certainly do some signposting,” the organization nevertheless
does not refer clients to resettlement because “it’s too labor and resource intensive.”
Moreover, the CVT is not funded to do resettlement referrals, nor are they charged with
ensuring that information about their clients follows them to the United States. Although
such a responsibility should not fall on the shoulders of the CVT, this vital information
should be shared to help enhance the resettlement experience of, and care for, Iraqis in the
United States.216
The disjunction between needs and services – like resettling, or failing to resettle, victims of
torture in locations with torture treatment centers – begins while a refugee is still in a
country of first asylum. The UNHCR collects detailed information for each of its referrals to
the OPE over the course of three or four interviews.217 This information is then given to the
OPE, which prepares the case for adjudication by the USCIS.218 At all points in this process,
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any information that is not digitally captured is hand-recorded by an IOM employee.219 The
PRM dictates the amount of information that is communicated from the IOM database to the
volags when making placement decisions and post-arrival.220
At the IOM, the OPE in Amman, there are four points at which a vulnerability could be
detected: (1) upon referral from the UNHCR, if included in the referral form; (2) during the
preparation of the file by the IOM, if a refugee identifies a special vulnerability; (3) if the
caseworker flags something unusual and notes it; or (4) during the medical examination.221
Notably, there is no formal mechanism for reporting any vulnerability identified by the
USCIS during its adjudication interview, which occurs between steps three and four above.
There is no point at which any U.S. government employee or contracted party is tasked with
investigating and reporting the presence of a needs-related vulnerability for the purposes of
ensuring post-arrival assistance. Instead, such information is only gathered to help support
the individual’s persecution claim.
In addition to points at which vulnerability data would be entered into the record or missed,
there are four reasons for which cases are expedited for faster processing at the IOMAmman: (1) for medical reasons, (2) for protection reasons, (3) for a compelling
humanitarian need, or (4) if something is overdue.222 Although these four grounds are tied
to flags within their database, the IOM reported that “more often than not it is just a sticky
note stuck on someone’s computer to move ‘X’ case along or to the top of the pile for ‘X’
reason—or at least keep track of it.”223 In addition to this failure, evaluating whether the
individual vulnerability merits faster processing is not tied to the vulnerabilities identified
above.
Intuitively, the medical exam would seem the best avenue for revealing any latent but
serious conditions. This exam is required before a refugee is allowed to travel to the United
States; however, like the DHS interview, its purpose is to verify admissibility, not needs.224
Because of the speed of processing, the exam is sometimes conducted only after
information about a refugee has been sent to the volags, who make a placement decision
without medical records.225 If a volag later finds out that a serious medical condition was
not previously identified, it sends a “medical anomaly” report to the State Department.226
This presents serious complications if a refugee must be hastily relocated to a different
location based on newly-discovered needs or is left in a location without specialized
services.227 Even when medical records are received, they are often inadequate. One
community health professional in Detroit reported that the medical records she receives are
often illegible or otherwise useless for identifying mental health issues.228 The USRAP must
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do a better job identifying vulnerabilities and sharing this information with those who will
ultimately provide the services.229
Unlike countries that intentionally seek refugees on the basis of presumed ability to
integrate, the USRAP is committed to protecting all UNHCR-referred refugees, making it
needs-blind. Refugees are not further screened on the basis of their personal vulnerabilities
or qualities, and this is commendable. In fact, refugee vulnerabilities are the basis for
admission. To the extent that vulnerabilities are captured as part of the adjudication
process, they are not communicated to volags to ensure quality post-resettlement services.
Moreover, the resource constraint and speed under which the placement mechanism
operates further reduces the information that can be collected.
Yet the proper
identification, transfer, and use of this information is essential for resettled refugees to be
placed with resources that meet their needs and, by extension, help them to become
sustainably self-sufficient and achieve long-term integration. The system can no longer
afford to turn a blind eye to needs; vulnerabilities and needs must be identified to help
refugees post-resettlement.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The USRAP extends an offer of protection to tens of thousands of the world’s most
vulnerable refugees each year. Historically, the program has followed through with this
commitment. For too long, however, there has been a myopic focus on the quantity of
refugees admitted to the detriment of the quality of resettlement.
This report shows that Iraqi refugees recently resettled to the United States are not faring
well. Most are not securing sustainable employment, and many are not able to support
themselves or their families on the public assistance they are receiving. Some have become
homeless. Iraqi refugees are also suffering from the effects of war: some are torture victims
and many have serious mental health issues needing treatment. Finally, Iraqi refugees are
often not able to access medical treatment due to administrative hurdles and insufficient
funding in the system, further undermining prospects for long-term integration.
In addition to concerns about immediate survival, this report shows that the USRAP is not
doing enough to enable Iraqi refugees to become sustainably self-sufficient. Employment
services are seriously underfunded in areas such as Detroit, where a large proportion of
Iraqi refugees are resettled. English language training is also largely insufficient to prepare
Iraqi refugees for sustainable employment. Lack of transportation undermines all aspects of
the resettlement process, including the ability of Iraqi refugees to secure employment.
Support for recertifying Iraqi refugees or providing vocational training is nearly nonexistent, even though many Iraqi refugees come to the United States with significant
educational and professional accomplishments.
Lack of planning and information sharing in the USRAP amplifies these problems. Funding
mechanisms, especially those designed to fund social and employment services, tend to be
retroactive: they fund localities that have previously resettled large amounts of refugees
rather than those that are going resettle large amounts of refugees. This leads to large
caseloads for refugee caseworkers, contributing to higher refugee unemployment.
Secondary migration, a relatively predictable phenomenon, is not adequately tracked.
Similarly, information regarding a refugee’s unique needs, including medical conditions, is
often passed on only informally, if at all. There is simply no system for collecting,
transferring and acting on refugee information for planning purposes. At almost every stage
of processing, the individual parts that make up the USRAP do not see themselves as
responsible for the long-term protection of refugees but rather only for the small part they
are doing. No agency is measuring whether the combined efforts actually protect refugees
in the long-term.
Yet resettlement of Iraqi refugees remains a vital tool of international refugee protection.
Iraqi refugees in Jordan and in other countries of first asylum lack important legal rights and
protections. They are unable to work legally, and face discrimination and abuse as a result
of their uncertain circumstances. Without any prospect of voluntary repatriation in the near
future, the USRAP remains an important option for many Iraqi refugees. It is, therefore,
crucial that the inadequacies of the program be identified and remedied so that resettled
Iraqi refugees are able to achieve long-term self-sufficiency and integration.
As President Obama said in an April 2009 speech at Georgetown, “We simply cannot
sacrifice the long-term investments that we so desperately need to generate long-term
prosperity. Just as a cash-strapped family may cut back on luxuries but will insist on
spending money to get their children through college, so we as a country have to make
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current choices with an eye on the future.”230 The resettlement programs on which Iraqi
refugees depend while they rebuild their lives are not luxuries; they are the long-term
investments necessary to fulfill America’s promise to refugees.

230

Barack H. Obama, President of the United States, Speech at Georgetown University (Apr. 14, 2009).

42

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Continued Resettlement
a. The United States should continue its commitment to the resettlement of Iraqi
refugees in numbers at least equal to those admitted during FY 2009.
b. Cultural orientation programs should be extended and information about
resettlement should be provided to refugees early in the process and long before
their departure dates.
Long-Term Self-Sufficiency and Integration
a. Refugee assistance should ideally be decoupled from mainstream welfare
programs and tailored to meet the specific needs of refugees.
b. Refugee Cash Assistance should be increased to cover all basic expenses and
extended to eighteen months.
c. The PRM and ORR should request higher funding levels for refugee admissions
and services that better reflect the real needs of refugees.
d. Increased funding should in particular be directed at employment services,
English language training, transportation services, educational opportunities,
professional recertification, housing, and medical treatment, including treatment
for survivors of torture and refugees with post-traumatic stress disorder.
e. ORR should work with states to identify and remove administrative barriers to
integration, such as issues with driver’s license applications, social security,
employment authorization, and unnecessary gaps in cash assistance or medical
coverage.
Improved Strategic Planning
a. The White House should clearly identify one lead agency to coordinate all
agencies and organizations involved in the USRAP.
b. All relevant agencies and stakeholders should implement planning procedures to
anticipate the arrival of new groups of refugees, taking into consideration new
influxes of refugees, vulnerabilities, local services capacity, and secondary
migration.
c. Congress should amend the Refugee Act and the ORR should amend its
regulations so that funding formulas are flexible and can be adapted to new
resettlement patterns, particularly those used for RSS and TAG.
d. Whenever possible, funding formulas should not be based on historical trends but
on prospective refugee arrivals; if past arrivals must be considered, only the
previous fiscal year should be considered.
Increased Information Gathering and Sharing
a. The USRAP should implement a holistic review of information gathering and
sharing procedures to better account for specific refugee populations.
b. In places where the PRM-funded assistance programs identify information vital to
resettlement programs, the PRM should institute an information sharing
mechanism between the two service providers.
c. The PRM should expand the types and amount of information that is provided to
U.S. volags before placement to ensure that individuals are resettled to a location
that is able to provide the best possible care and services. This may include
sharing the UNHCR-prepared resettlement registration form or the full panel
physician report, or both.
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Enhanced Coordination
a. The designated lead agency, in consultation with all relevant actors, should
develop new procedures that outline a common, consistent strategy for the
placement of individual refugees, taking into account the needs of each refugee,
state and volag resources, and recent trends prior to a refugee’s arrival.
b. The PRM should consider creating an individual case management system for
post-adjudication and pre-departure refugees, which would advise individual
refugees in light of known post-resettlement administrative hurdles and help
them anticipate, and prepare for or avoid them.
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APPENDIX I: INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED
Iraqi Refugees
• Amman, Jordan, 29 refugees
• Detroit, Michigan, 39 refugees
• Washington, D.C., 7 refugees
U.S. Government Agencies and Officials
• County of San Diego, Health and Human Services Agency
• Office of Representative John Dingell (D-MI)
• Office of Representative Alcee Hastings (D-FL)
• Office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA)
• Refugee Specialists, Michigan Department of Human Services
• State Refugee Coordinator for Arizona
• State Refugee Coordinator for Colorado
• State Refugee Coordinator for Michigan
• U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee
Resettlement (ORR)
• U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM)
• U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS)
Foreign Government Agencies and Officials
• European Commission Humanitarian Aid Organization
• Office of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation (Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan)
• Office of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Social Development
(Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan)
Non-Governmental
Organizations,
Inter-Governmental
Organizations,
Advocacy Groups
• Amnesty International
• Human Rights First
• Human Rights Watch
• International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
• International Organization for Migration (IOM)
• Refugee Council of Australia
• Refugees International
• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

and

Volags
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Church World Services
Episcopal Migration Ministries
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society
International Rescue Committee (IRC)
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration and Refugee Service
World Relief

Local Community Groups and Others
• American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Dearborn, Michigan Office
• Chaldean Federation of America
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Financial Aid Office, Henry Ford Community College
Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University
Karbalaa Islamic Education Center
Kurdish Human Rights Watch
Lamphere School District
Office of the Dean, Georgetown University Law Center
Holland & Knight LLP
Ropes & Gray LLP
Student Council on Racial Reconciliation

Service Providers
• Arab Chaldean Council
• Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services
• Archdiocese of Detroit, Office of Refugee Services
• Catholic Charities, Diocese of San Diego, Refugee Services
• Center for Victims of Torture
• International Catholic Migration Commission
• International Rescue Committee, San Diego, California Office
• Islamic Relief
• Lutheran Social Services of Maryland
• Lutheran Social Services of Michigan Refugee Services, Southfield, Michigan
Office
• Save the Children
• U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, Dearborn, Michigan Office
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APPENDIX II: MICHIGAN CASE STUDY
Efforts since 2007 to resettle tens of thousands of Iraqis to the United States caused a
sudden and dramatic increase in refugee arrivals to the state of Michigan, particularly the
four counties of metropolitan Detroit. As demonstrated in Table 1, from FY 2006 to FY
2008, the number of arrivals statewide increased 410%. Table 3 shows that over the same
period, the number of arrivals in metropolitan Detroit increased 1,565%.
However, the RSS funding formula allocates federal resources based on the number of
refugees who arrived to a state in the preceding three years.231 By this metric, RSS funds
to Michigan actually decreased by four percent from FY 2007 to FY 2008, even though in
that fiscal year the number of arrivals far eclipsed the three previous years combined. In
other words, the funding formula set social services capacity in Michigan to assist an
average of 845 refugees per year. In reality, Michigan received over 3,243 refugees that
year. The Detroit area alone received 2,415 refugees, all of whom were Iraqi. Moreover,
discretionary grants to supplement the RSS funding were insufficient to compensate for the
inadequate formula funding. Grants for a combined total of $500,000 were awarded to two
Detroit-area agencies in 2008.232
In FY 2009 the formula period finally captured the surge in arrivals that began in earnest in
FY 2008, however RSS funds still only increased by 72.8% from the previous fiscal year.
Because the arrivals preceding FY 2008 still counted toward allocation entitled to Michigan,
RSS funds set social services capacity for an average of 1,615 refugees per year. As of
August, 3,163 refugees have arrived in Michigan for FY 2009.
The fiscal years preceding FY 2008 will continue to distort Michigan’s RSS funds until FY
2011, when the formula period will at last capture three years with increased arrivals. Until
that time, social services capacity will be significantly underfunded.

231

For FY 2007, FY 2008, and FY 2009, the ORR allocated social services funds according to the following
formula:
(1) the total amount of available funds budgeted, divided by;
(2) the total number of refugees and other eligible populations who arrived in the U.S. in the preceding
three years, with the resulting per capita multiplied by;
(3) the number of persons in the state as of September 2007, adjusted for secondary migration.
Office of Refugee Resettlement, Notice of Final Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Formula Allocation for States for Refugee
Social Services (Aug. 27, 2007), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/grants/open/HHS-2007-ACF-ORR-RS0115_final.html [hereinafter FY 2007 Formula Allocation]. Office of Refugee Resettlement, Notice of Final
Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Formula Allocation for States for Refugee Social Services (Sept. 24, 2008) (on file with
author) [hereinafter FY 2008 Formula Allocation]. Office of Refugee Resettlement, Notice of Final Fiscal Year
(FY) 2009 Formula Allocation for States for Refugee Social Services (July 28, 2009), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/grants/open/HHS-2009-ACF-ORR-ORRRS-0070.html [hereinafter FY 2009 Formula
Allocation].
232
Office of Refugee Resettlement, Unanticipated Arrivals – 2008 Supplemental Services Grantees. available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/unanticipated_arrivals_prg.htm.
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Table 1. Total Refugee Arrivals in
Iraqi Arrivals233
FY 2006
153
FY 2007
577
FY 2008
2556
FY 2009*
2130

Michigan, FY 2006-August 2009
Total Arrivals234
vs. (FY – 1)
636
1271
+ 99.8%
3243
+ 155%
3163
-

vs. (FY – 2)
+ 410%
-

Table 2. Formula Allocations to Michigan for Refugee Social Services
Formula
Period

Refugees

Others

Total

RSS Funds

vs.
(FY – 1)

FY 2007235

Oct 03 – Sept
06

2213

769

2982

$1,141,198

-

FY 2008236

Oct 04 – Sept
07

2535

404

2939

$1,095,849

- 4%

FY 2009237

Oct 05 – Sept
08

4844

481

5325

$1,894,320

+ 72.8%

Table 3. Refugee Arrivals in Detroit Metro-Area, FY 2006-August 2009
Wayne
Oakland
Macomb
Washtenaw
Total
vs.
Co.
Co.
Co.
Co.
(FY –1)
FY 2006
42
82
13
8
145
FY 2007
50
86
383
28
547
+ 277%
FY 2008

280

943

1138

54

2415

+ 341%

FY 2009* 168
720
*Through August 2009 only.

1081

49

2018

-

vs.
(FY – 2)
+
1565%
-

233
E-mail from Dawn Arwood, Analyst, Office of Refugee Services, State of Michigan (Sept. 23, 2009, 12:16:46
EST) (on file with author). Ms. Arwood confirmed that all arrivals for this period were indeed Iraqi. Id.
234
E-mail from Dawn Arwood, Analyst, Office of Refugee Services, State of Michigan (Sept. 29, 2009, 12:24:27
EST) (on file with author).
235
FY 2007 Formula Allocation, supra note 231.
236
FY 2008 Formula Allocation, supra note 231.
237
FY 2009 Formula Allocation, supra note 231.
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APPENDIX III: IRAQI REFUGEE STORIES
DETROIT
“Hamza” KSLP 1 3/10/2009: Hamza worked as a middle school teacher in Iraq until
fleeing to Turkey with his wife and daughter in 2008. He was resettled to Detroit, and he
currently receives financial help from his sons and plans to apply for Supplemental Security
Income (SSI). His daughter is in school but is too old to qualify as a dependent; therefore,
the Michigan Department of Human Services is threatening to cut his daughter’s benefits if
she does not start working. However, if her benefits are cut, she will either have to give up
her education to find work. Alternatively, if Hamza’s SSI application is approved, he will be
able to support her.
“Qays” GPRW 1 3/10/2009: In Iraq, Qays worked in welding and inventory
management, having studied for two years at a technical institute. He fled to Lebanon in
2005, where he also lived through the June 2006 war in that country. He was resettled to
Columbus, Ohio, with his wife and four children but migrated to Detroit twenty days after
arrival to connect with a Syrian friend who promised to help him find a job. After nearly six
months, he still cannot find work. His family receives $828 per month in cash assistance;
their monthly rent is $700.
“Wael” KSLP 2 3/10/2009: Before fleeing to Turkey, Wael worked in a liquor store in
Iraq. Resettled in Detroit, he lives on SSI. Money is tight. Because there are seven people
in his family, they need a house, and rent for one is very expensive.
“Waleed” KSLP 5 3/10/2009: Waleed worked as a barber in Iraq before fleeing in 2008
to Turkey. He was resettled to St. Louis, Missouri, but migrated to Detroit within sixteen
days to join his second cousin. He planned to join this cousin as soon as he found out he
was coming to the United States, but they are not sufficiently closely related to qualify for
sponsorship due to Detroit-specific restrictions imposed in late 2008. Because he was placed
in St. Louis without a sponsor, his volag used his R&P money for rent and furniture. After
his family moved to Michigan, his relative supported them until they started receiving their
benefits. This support, he says, is the most important thing to have as he rebuilds his life.
“Saeed” RWGP 1 3/10/2009: In Iraq, Saeed, who has one year of post-secondary
technical school education, worked as an oil pipe welder before fleeing in 1998. He lived in
Jordan for six months, moved to Syria for five years, and then moved to Lebanon until
2003. He and his wife, mother, and brother were resettled to Chicago, Illinois but migrated
to Detroit after three weeks because he could not find a job. He now has a two-month-old
son, and after seven months in Detroit, he still does not have a job. The price of rent
consumes all his cash assistance.
“Salah” RWGP 3 3/10/2009: Salah fled Iraq in 1997, living first in Jordan for two years
and then in Syria for ten years. He was resettled to Columbus, Ohio with his wife and two
children, but migrated to Detroit ten days later in order to join his religious community and
reunite with friends. He is a torture survivor, and he has applied for SSI but still has no
news on his application. In the meantime, he receives nearly $600 per month in cash
assistance, which is just enough to pay his bills in Detroit. He would move to Dearborn if he
could afford it.
“Haifa” AWLP 1 3/11/2009: Haifa worked as a social worker at a high school for 15
years before her children were born. Her family fled to Jordan 2006. Haifa’s 24-year-old son
and 22-year-old daughter preceded her to Detroit; she and her mother joined them four
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months later. “We lost everything,” she said. The Mahdi Army accused the family of loyalty
to Saddam because they are Sunni. Haifa’s husband and son were kidnapped. One of her
sons is still in Jordan because security screening delayed his application, even though he is
young and never served with the Iraqi military.
“Bahja” AWLP 2 3/11/2009: Bahja was a housewife in Iraq before fleeing to Syria in
2004. Her husband had been a truck driver in Iraq and found work in Syria at a shisha
factory. Her family was resettled directly to Detroit. Because they arrived on the 28th day of
the month, their first three days in the United States counted as a full month of their eightmonth total refugee assistance. Their cash assistance is about to expire, but the family
qualifies for TANF. Still, they live hand-to-mouth, and the time it will take to reopen their
case with Michigan Department of Human Services worries Bahja. She insists that her
husband is capable and can do any work, saying, “Just give him [work].”
“Jameel” KSAW 1 3/11/2009: Jameel worked in tourism and for high-class hotels. After
the U.S.-led invasion, he worked for four years arranging logistics for a major news outlet.
In 2007, he fled to Lebanon with his wife and children. They were resettled to Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, as a “free case” because Jameel had no immediate family in the United
States. The family migrated to Detroit three months later to join distant relatives. Their
benefits were reopened quickly after the move to Detroit, and this helped him afford to rent
his own apartment. Still, they receive only $690 per month in cash assistance, and their
rent is $750.
“Yusef” KSGP/RW 1 3/11/2009: In Iraq, Yusef owned a used auto parts business before
fleeing to Syria in 2004, where he lived for four years before being resettled to Detroit. At
first he, his wife, and their four children lived with relatives on R&P money. Because of
difficulties finding a suitable home for a family of six, it took two months for them to settle
in to a home of their own. During the delay, Yusef and his family did not open their case
with the Michigan Department of Human Services because their relatives did not want them
to use their address to apply for benefits. Nine months after their arrival, his oldest son,
now nineteen, no longer qualifies for assistance. His other three children are 18, 14, and 13
years old. They receive $680 per month cash assistance; rent alone is $600. He is worried
because his 18-year-old daughter will soon “age out” of assistance. He cannot work and is
waiting for an SSI referral from his physician.
“Hakeem” LPAW 1 3/11/2009: Hakeem worked as a driver in Iraq before fleeing to
Turkey in 2008. He was resettled to Detroit with his wife and four children because his
wife’s brother was already living there for seven years. Although housing is more expensive
where they live, they need to be near their brother-in-law because he provides their only
transportation. They were unable to buy a car because all their R&P money went toward the
security deposit for the small house they rent.
“Luay” RWGP/KS 1 3/11/2009: Luay has only a sixth-grade education and worked as a
barber, cleaner, and taxi driver in Iraq before fleeing to Turkey in 2004. He was resettled to
Detroit with his wife and four children. They live in a two-bedroom apartment for $750 per
month plus utilities, but receive only $800 monthly in cash assistance. Other landlords
rejected them because six people living in two bedrooms violates housing codes, even
though Luay cannot afford a bigger apartment. After seven months, he still has no job. He
has been attending ESL classes, but complains that the quality of instruction is poor and all
the jobs available require English. Once, his caseworker finally found him a job at a hotel;
he attended three days of unpaid training only to be told that he was no longer needed. As
the end of his eight months of assistance draws near he says, “I don’t know what to tell
you. I don’t think about tomorrow. If they stop assistance, God will provide.”
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“Sinwan” AWKS 1 3/12/2009: In Iraq, the vocation of Sinwan’s husband was to recite
the Qur’an at religious events. They fled to Syria together in 2002. She registered with the
UNHCR in Damascus to get assistance and apply for resettlement. Because her husband’s
friend in Detroit did not qualify as an anchor, they were resettled to Columbus, Ohio, as a
“free case.” They moved to Detroit seven days later. Sinwan’s husband, a torture survivor,
suffers from depression and cannot work. Medicaid covers his primary care for now, but
once it runs out the best they can hope for is Emergency Medicaid, which will not cover
doctor’s visits. The house they rent has no glass in some of the windows, and she fears the
cold makes her husband’s depression worse. He has sought mental health services, but has
yet to receive torture treatment. She wants to work but needs to learn English first. She
goes to free ESL classes sponsored by a local organization.
“Farrah” AWLP 1 3/12/2009: Farah worked as a physical education teacher in Iraq
before fleeing to Syria in 2007. She and her mother were resettled to Los Angeles,
California to join an uncle who lived there but migrated to Detroit after four months. While
in Los Angeles, she refused to join her uncle’s case because it would reduce his benefits.
She and her mother waited until their arrival in Michigan to open their cases. Hoping to earn
a degree or recertify to teach in the United States, she tried to get financial aid to study at
Henry Ford Community College. Getting financial aid is difficult, she says, because her fouryear degree makes her ineligible for many programs. She resents that she still depends on
the government and says that she would not have accepted resettlement if she had known
she would not be able to access the kind of support she needs to get back on her own two
feet.
“Mariya” AWLP 3 3/12/2009: Mariya was resettled to rural Pennsylvania, after fleeing to
Jordan with her family in 2007, because she mentioned in her interview with the OPE that
her brother lives there. However, after only 19 days in Pennsylvania, she moved to Detroit
because she wanted to live in an Arab-American community. But now, neither her husband
nor her son can find work. She complains that the state human service workers make her
and her family feel like they are begging.
“Nada” AWKS 3 3/13/2009: Before fleeing to Syria in 2007, Nada was a housewife. In
Syria, she applied for resettlement immediately because she knew she could never return to
Iraq. She was resettled to Detroit, joining her brother. Nada now rents an apartment with
her husband, but without a car, they are isolated. Although they quickly received food
stamps, cash assistance took about 40 to 45 days to arrive. Their R&P money was not
enough in the meantime; it barely paid the first month's bills. Although her husband goes to
ESL classes, she must stay at home to care for their disabled eight year-old child, as well as
their four year-old. Despite these difficulties, she does not want to risk moving elsewhere
because she has family and community in Detroit.
“Seema” AWKS 4 3/13/2009: Seema was a housewife before fleeing to Turkey in 2004.
She, her husband, and their 17-year-old son were resettled to Detroit. They lived with her
brother for a month, and then moved in with her other son and his family. This delayed her
ability to provide utility bills to the state of Michigan in order to apply for a driver’s license.
Her 75-year-old husband gets SSI, but she is too young, even though she has a heart
problem, high cholesterol, and rheumatism. Seema has not heard back yet about her
Emergency Medicaid application, and she survives on her husband's SSI and her 31-yearold son's minimum wage income for now. Her son did not find the job through employment
services, but by asking around in the Arab community. She loves Michigan and has even
gotten used to the weather.
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“Wafa” AWKS 7 3/13/2009: Wafa was a cook and seamstress in Iraq before fleeing to
Syria in 2006. She was resettled to Chicago, Illinois but migrated to Detroit 55 days later to
join a relative whom she believed could help her find work. She interviewed for a
housekeeping position but could not start the next day because she had no transportation.
Then she was offered a job at a pizza place, but the shift conflicted with her and her
daughter's ESL class.
“Layla” AWKS 9 3/13/2009: Layla holds a bachelor’s degree in computer science, and in
2006 she fled to Jordan with her husband. They were resettled to Texas, but did not know
anyone there. Nine months later, they joined relatives in Detroit. Layla cannot recertify to
work in computer science because she is too busy taking care of her three children.
“Sara” AWKS 11 3/13/2009: Sara worked as an accountant in Iraq before fleeing to
Syria in 2006. She was resettled to South Carolina, where her voluntary agency set her up
in a one-bathroom house with another Iraqi refugee family and a large Burmese refugee
family. After a week of no contact with social workers, Sara decided to join her cousins in
Michigan after 12 days in South Carolina. For her, language is a major barrier to
recertification as an accountant.
“Iman” AWKS 13 3/13/2009: Iman worked as a teacher in Iraq before fleeing to
Lebanon in 1999. She was resettled to New Mexico but migrated to Detroit thirteen days
after arrival to reunite with her brother. Although she has been in the United States for six
months, she still has not received employment authorization. Lacking the English skills and
documentation of her teaching qualifications, Iman worries that recertifying would take too
long. She said she would be happy to work as a janitor at a school, just so she can be in an
educational environment.
“Mr. Aboud” RWLP 3/13/2009: In Iraq, Mr. Aboud worked in the public relations
department of a pharmaceutical company. He is a veterinarian by training, with a postgraduate degree in food hygiene. His wife is a physician with a master’s degree in fertility.
He served the U.S. military as a translator before fleeing with his wife and three children to
Jordan in 2006. During the two years he lived in Amman, Mr. Aboud worked primarily for
humanitarian NGOs. He and his family were resettled to Detroit and enrolled in the MG
program. Mr. Aboud’s volag found his 18-year-old daughter a job at coffee and donut shop,
but he feels that he received no special attention as a MG client. After confronting his
caseworker over the results, he was told that his job search was hopeless because he and
his wife are 50 years old and overqualified. But he claims he did not ask for work that
matched their qualifications. He said, “I yelled at this time. I didn’t ask for this. I can work
as an assistant or a caregiver. I don’t care.” He would like to recertify, but the required
course costs $9,000, and he and his wife are ineligible for most programs because they
already have degrees.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
“Maryam” DHTO 1 3/11/2009: After her husband was killed in 2005, she fled to Jordan
with her young children.
They registered with the UNHCR immediately and sought
resettlement. Because no one met her at the airport, she tells us, she had to go to a shelter
for homeless families. She has been living there with her children ever since. The oldest two
are enrolled in school, but because it is so far away from the shelter, they have to wake up
at 5:30 every morning. The transition from a middle-class, married lifestyle in Iraq to
homelessness and single-parenthood in the United States has been stressful and traumatic.
She has been taking prescription antidepressants, but now finds that psychiatrists and other
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doctors will not accept her Medicaid coverage. She says, “I left Iraq to find security, but
what kind of security is it to live in a homeless shelter?”
“Hamza” IKSF 1 3/13/2009: Hamza worked as a physician in Iraq, including eight
months under contract in the green zone, before fleeing to Jordan in 2005. During
resettlement processing in Jordan, he was told that recertification in the United States
would be easy. After arrival, however, he learned that the process, which must be
completed in five years, costs nearly $3,000 and includes three exams and a residency
requirement.
“Mamdouh” TODH 1 3/13/2009: Mamdouh worked as a translator for the U.S. Army in
eight different units. Later, he worked for a military contractor and then at a foreign
embassy. After the translating contractor leaked a list of Iraqis who had worked for the
Multinational Forces, he applied for resettlement. Now that he is in the United States, he
would like to use his training as an electrical engineer. To be recertified, however, he needs
a copy of his college diploma, which he was not able to obtain before leaving Iraq.
JORDAN
“Badr” IKJG 2 5/20/2009: Badr has been approved for resettlement but expressed
concern that it will take a full year before he can adjust his status in the United States. He
says that getting legal status makes all the difference. Even though he knows he will
struggle with financial problems in the United States, he feels will be better off there than in
Jordan, where he is unable to obtain legal status.
“Adil” IKJG 3 5/20/2009: Adil refused an offer of resettlement to the United States
because he heard that the assistance is inadequate and too short-lived. He says, “How could
I buy food for my children? I have medical problems in my back and legs. I wish that the
United States would look at my health situation.” He works a volunteer with a humanitarian
assistance NGO and receives a small stipend.
“Saad” IKJG 5 5/20/2009: Saad was approved for resettlement with his wife and four
children. He worries that he will arrive and be treated like an immigrant rather than a
refugee and that he will not get the assistance he needs. He is disappointed that his children
will miss the end of the school year because of the quick departure, making it necessary to
repeat a grade.
“Nadir” TODA 1 5/21/2009: Nadir is confined to a wheelchair. After waiting for news on
the status of his application for 17 months, he closed his case with IOM because he could
not bear the process any longer.
“Naima” TODA 2 5/21/2009: Although she is college-educated, Naima is prepared to
work any job once she, her husband, and their three sons are resettled to Arizona. She is
well aware that the assistance waiting for them is meager. She looks forward to living in
safety and stability but expresses her fear of the unknown: “I am happy I will be in America
because it will be safe and I will feel settled. But I am scared. Where will I go if I am
hungry? At least I know in Iraq, if I were hungry, I could go knock on my neighbor’s door
and ask for some food. But there? What can I do?”
“Shaimaa” TODA 4 5/21/2009: Before fleeing Iraq, Shaimaa was a student and had
completed two years of college for graphic design. Without any work in Jordan, she tried
selling the ceramic art she made to pass time. She sold an expensive piece to man who now
refuses to pay her. Then she found a job in Amman as a typist in a lawyer’s office; however,
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when she went to a bank to cash her first check, she was told that the check was deficient
and she could not cash it. She was saddened to have encountered such “oppression” while
waiting for resettlement when, she says, “We have been so patient.” She decries the lack of
transparency and certainty in the resettlement process saying, “How many years will we be
waiting here? Until when? Until when? We don’t know our future. Even those [resettled]
outside are not secure. After three months, then what? What are you going to do?”
“Zainab” TODA 5 5/21/2009: Zainab criticizes the discrimination that Iraqis experience
in Jordan. Her daughter is paid one-tenth the wages of a Jordanian girl holding the same
position. Even if an Iraqi is lucky enough to get a job, she says, employers can and do fire
Iraqis for arbitrary reasons or pretexts. “There is no security here,” she says.
“Amira” TODA 9 5/21/2009: After her infant son was kidnapped and ransomed in Iraq,
Amira and her family fled to Jordan. The trauma of the experience caused her older son to
develop a stutter. She believes that if Iraqis had the right to work in Jordan, fewer people
would seek resettlement. Despite being registered with the UNHCR, she fears that the
Jordanian government could still mistreat or deport her.
“Subhi” SALP 1 5/22/2009: After fleeing Iraq with his mother, brother, and two married
sisters in 2005, Subhi did not apply for resettlement for two years because he managed to
start a hotel business and his father was sick. He has residency in Jordan, but none of his
other family members do. After approval for resettlement, his family received a travel date
with only a few weeks notice. Because of his business, he could not just pick up and leave.
In addition, his sister was pregnant, and her doctor advised her not to fly. He requested a
delay of departure, but his request was denied, and they both missed their opportunity to
be resettled.
“Shadi” SALP 2 5/22/2009: Shadi fled Iraq because of threats on his life for working
with the Multinational Forces.
He registered with the UNHCR immediately to seek
resettlement.
When his case reached the OPE, it needed verification from the commanding officer of the
battalion with which he worked. However, the OPE was unable to contact the commanding
officer, who had since been transferred to another unit. Without this verification, his
application cannot move forward. Still, he is hopeful that he will reach California, where he
has a relative. He knows resettlement will be very difficult and that he will have to work
right away, but he is ready and willing. He had to work every single day in Iraq, he says, so
that proves he is a hard worker. “No place on earth is easy. But if you work, you will play.”
“Zaki” DATO 2 5/22/2009: As a young student studying Farsi, Zaki fled Iraq in 2004
because his service in the Iraqi military subjected him to threats from both militias and
members of the insurgency after he refused to fight against American forces. He believes
his application with the UNHCR is moving slowly because of his military service. He did not
understand why there was no explicit support from the U.S. government for people, like
him, who are refugees because they refused to take up arms against Americans. Although
deportation from Jordan is not as bad as it once was, the insecurity that comes from lacking
legal status still makes the situation for Iraqis in Jordan very difficult. Aware of the
differences in assistance between American states, he told us, "The situation in the [United
States] depends on the state. But really, whatever it can be, you are better there than in
Amman because at least you have legal status.”
“Riaz” DATO 4 5/23/2009: Riaz fled Iraq in 2006 and now studies Management
Information Systems at a private Jordanian university. He applied for resettlement. His
case moved very quickly, but he let his application falter because of his misgivings about
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resettlement in the United States. First, he is concerned that he will not be able to access
health care for a chronic condition that has already resulted in three surgeries. Second, he
feared that he would not be able to find work that does not require labor that exceeds his
physical limitations. He says, “If I can work, it would have to be behind a desk. And I don’t
know what options are available.” Third, he fears that resettlement will result in the
suspension of his studies indefinitely, and he knows that it would be difficult to receive
financial support to finish his degree at an expensive U.S. university. He does not
understand why the government would not help refugees get an education.
“Zayd” IKSA 1 5/23/2009: After fleeing to Jordan in 2004, Zayd registered with the
UNHCR for assistance. Despite the fact that most of his family is in Sweden, he was told
that his case would be suspended unless he accepted an offer to resettle in the United
States. For him, the difference in benefits between the United States and Sweden is not
important; he just wants to be with his family so that he can help his siblings care for their
mother.
“Bakr” JGLP 1 5/23/2009: Bakr applied for an Special Immigrant Visa while still in Iraq,
but the application moved slowly. After he was shot in the leg, he fled to Jordan. He sleeps
with a pistol under his pillow “I still have nightmares now. I am just starting to heal,” he
says. It took three months to transfer his visa application when he left Iraq. While waiting in
Jordan, he tried to move the process along by sending the OPE a picture of his wounds. He
received notice of approval just six days before his departure. The three-month wait in
Jordan depleted most of his savings, so he only had about $100 left to take with him to the
United States.
“Gabr” JGLP 2 5/23/2009: Gabr fled Iraq in 2006 and registered with the UNHCR for
protection and assistance upon arrival in Jordan. He did not apply for resettlement until a
year later. His application was denied after one seven-minute interview, and he has tried
multiple times to reapply and ask about resettlement. “No one is giving me a chance,” he
says. He wants resettlement because he feels very insecure in Jordan and knows that he
could be deported at any time. If that happens, he says, “I will be killed.” “If I lose my
family, my home, respect, I mean nothing. I am here illegally . . . . I want to begin again. I
only want to live in peace, to live in respect.” He told us that the uncertainty of his situation
makes him feel as threatened as he did when he was in Iraq.
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